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In a 1982 referendum, the voters of California approved Proposition
8-the first state "victim's rights"' amendment-revising a number, of
provisions of the California Constitution.2 1 wrote The Wrongs of Victim's
Rights 3 in response to that referendum and the Reagan Administration's Task
Force on Victims of Crime FinalReport.4 At the time I wrote the article, I had
recently been a victim of a violent rape committed by a burglar; I had had two
friends murdered in separate killings; and I knew others who had had family
members killed, as well as many friends who were victims of other crimes.
I had also practiced law briefly as a prosecutor and then for a longer time as
a defense attorney. I was concerned that Proposition 8 appeared only
incidentally to be aimed at the concerns of victims; its real purpose was to
serve crime control, conservative, and 'prosecutorial interests. As it turned
out, Proposition 8 was apparently inadequate to serve crime control interests
or to mollify victims. California voters approved yet another amendment in
1991, Proposition 115, The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act.5
Other states have followed California's lead and enacted victim's rights
amendments and statutes. Still, according to the advocates of a federal
Professor of Law & Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University-Bloomington. I
thank my Indiana colleagues Craig Bradley and Dan Conkle, and the participants in the
Feminist Theory Workshop for their comments and insights. Many thanks also to Susan
Bandes and Robert Mosteller for comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
'A question arises as to the placement of the apostrophe in the term "victim's rights."
Most authors treat victims as a plural, but as these rights are individual and not group rights,
I chose the singular form to emphasize this fact.
2See Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 938 &
n.87 (1985) (discussing 1982 California victim's rights initiative).
31d.
4PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME FINAL REPORT (1982).
-'See Laura Berend, Proposition 115 Preliminary Hearings: Sacrificing Reliability on the
Altar of Expediency?, 23 PAC. L.J. 1131, 1131 & n. 1(1992) (discussing passage and impact
of Proposition 115).
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constitutional amendment for victim's rights, these measures remain
inadequate.6
Over the past three years, the emergence of the effort to amend the
United States Constitution has led me to revisit victim's rights issues.
Nothing has changed to make me believe I was mistaken in my 1985
assessment. Although I have sympathy for victims of crimes, or victims of
any extreme trauma, I continue to believe that crime control conservatives use
victims and victim's rights to achieve ends other than helping victims
recover.
The opportunity to participate in this Symposium, however, has given
me a chance to stand back and consider crime victim's rights proposals in
terms of our larger constitutional structure and practice. It has also enabled
me to think about intricacies of the relationships between prosecutors and
victims. Finally, it has given me an opportunity to discuss the personal
experience that was relegated to a footnote in my original article on the
subject. Because many proponents use anecdote to "prove" the need for an
amendment, the purpose of this Part is to provide a counter-example. That
experience led me to question the need for a victim's rights amendment then
and now. My experience is by no means determinative, but I include it both
as a relevant piece of information about why the subject interested me
originally and as an illustration of a "successful" experience under a regime
that predated any victim's rights amendments.
Although crime victims have hardly been ignored by Congress, state
legislatures, voters, courts, and others, the campaign to add a victim's rights
amendment to the Constitution of the United States picked up its pace after
the "conservative revolution" of the 1994 elections Because of its attractive-
ness, the concept of an amendment becomes more important than a careful
consideration of the effects of such an amendment. Thus, supporters of an
amendment make claims based on generalizations about dangerous criminals
going free all the time, but they do not provide empirical evidence or studies
about what truly benefits victims, or analysis of how such an amendment
might affect substantive and procedural criminal law; nor do they seriously
consider the State's and the community's interests in crime prevention and
prosecution as interests independent of individual victims.
Against an appealing plea from a victim of a horribly violent crime or
a grief-stricken family, finding a good sound bite tojustify opposition to an
6See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the
Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 479 passim (stating that uniform victim's
rights at national level are needed).
7See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 949-50 (discussing impact of conservative
Congress on development of victim's rights).
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amendment is difficult. Opposition to the amendment superficially appears
to be "anti-victim." But opposition is not necessarily anti-victim, as many
victim organizations are coming to recognize. For example, Victim Services,
the largest victim assistance agency in the country, indicated in a 1998 letter
to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, "We
believe the proposed amendment is premature and inappropriate at this time
when existing [state and federal] provisions that aim to address victims'
interests have not been evaluated. Rather, what we need is research,
discussion and debate."' In fact, lack of empirical research and theoretical
and practical considerations argue against adoption of a victim's rights
amendment at this time. I am not urging caution because no one cares about
crime victims, but rather because critical distance is essential before we
embrace such a change in our fundamental charter of government.
In this Article, I examine the question of giving victims of crime a
formal constitutional role in the criminal justice process. I begin with an
overview of possible theoretical justifications for giving crime victims
constitutional rights in the context of our constitutional structure and practice.
Without an adequately theorized ground for the amendment, there are no
compelling justifications for amending the Constitution. I then examine
practical concerns with involving victims as co-equal parties in the criminal
justice process, focusing on the question of counsel. I am particularly
concerned with addressing the frequent assumption of a convergence of state,
prosecutorial, and victim interests. I next turn to my own story as a victim of
a violent crime and my experience with the criminal justice process. I
conclude by stating that adopting a federal victim's rights amendment, given
its lack ofjustification and its potentially harmful effects on victims and the
Constitution, would be a terrible mistake.
II. VICTIM'S RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The proposed federal victim's rights amendment has undergone a
number of revisions since it was first introduced by Senators Jon Kyl and
Diane Feinstein, and it is likely to undergo further change On such shifting
'Letter from Chris Whipple, Acting Executive Director, Victim Services, to Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch 3 (June 9, 1998) (on file with Senate Judiciary Committee).
9Senator Diane Feinstein's written testimony in the 1997 Hearings states, "We have
written forty-two different drafts of this amendment so far, as the language has evolved .... "
A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearings on S.J. Res. 6,
105th Cong. 24 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings on S.J. Res. 6] (statement of Sen. Diane
Feinstein). The 1999 version of the proposed Victim's Rights Amendment, S.J. Res. 3, has
dropped some of the provisions of S.J. Res. 44, and undoubtedly future versions will again
differ. Compare S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. (1999), with S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong. (1998).
No. 2]
386 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1999: 383
ground, it is difficult to criticize particular provisions. This does not preclude
the necessity for more general criticisms. Critical distance is essential to
determinations that could radically change our fundamental charter of
government."°
While proponents tend to focus their argument in the context of
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights dealing with the rights of the
accused, they have not yet provided a theoretical constitutional ground for
victim's rights. Because the victim's rights amendment seems more related
to criminal procedure than constitutional law, no serious scholarly consider-
ation of the implications of the amendment in terms of constitutional law has
appeared in law reviews-an omission that I believe is a mistake." In terms
of constitutional theory and practice, finding a theoretical ground is quite
difficult.
Although academically, and to a degree doctrinally, the Bill of Rights
provisions dealing with government conduct and rights in criminal cases have
been severed from constitutional theory and practice, Professors Stuntz, 2
Amar, 3 and Bandes' 4 have recently argued that the severance is artificial.
'eThe term "radical" is Professor Cassell's. See Cassell, supra note 6, passim.
"This omission may be because the most interested parties in the scholarly debate thus
far have been those who study and teach criminal law and procedure, and thus the issues are
obviously likely to engage their attention. But the victim's rights movement has captured the
support of Professor Laurence H. Tribe, a leading constitutional law scholar, and the
opposition of other leading constitutional law scholars, such as Erwin Chemerinsky, William
Van Alstyne, and Gerald Gunther. See generally Proposed Victims' Rights Constitutional
Amendment: Hearings on S.J Res. Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
140-48 (1997) (letter from Professors Erwin Chemerinsky, Lynne Henderson, Robert
Mosteller et al., to members of Senate Judiciary Committee) [hereinafter Law Professors'
Letter II] (signed by Profs. Chemerinsky, Van Alstyne, and Gunther, among others, stating
reasons for Congress to oppose a victim's rights amendment); Law Professors' Letter
Regarding the Proposed Victim's Rights Amendment (letter from Lynne Henderson et al., to
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, et al. 3 (Sept. 4, 1996) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Law Professors' Letter I] (same).
2See William J. Stuntz The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 396 (1995) (suggesting that survey of Fourth and Fifth Amendments' history and cases
"paint[s] a different picture than the one we usually see").
13See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 115 (1997) (suggesting that "'discourse in constitutional criminal procedure has
evolved separately, cutting itself off from larger themes of constitutional, remedial, and
jurisdictional theory").
4Susan Bandes, "We the People" and Our Enduring Values, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1376,
1376 (1998) (reviewingAMAR, supra note 13) ("[C]riminal law has been impoverished by its
failure to connect to 'larger themes of constitutional remedial, and jurisdiction theory."').
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These authors and others" have argued that constitutional theory applies to
these provisions as well as other parts of the Constitution, and I agree. The
reintegration of criminal procedure into constitutional law is in its infancy,
however, and no single agreed-upon historical or theoretical approach to
reincorporating these amendments exists at this time.6 For that matter, no
absolute agreement on the history and theory of the Constitution itself exists;
there are several competing theories, although there is a rich literature that
centers on basic themes. Thus, understanding, interpretation, and application
of constitutional doctrine has many components and competing approaches.
Accordingly, while the theoretical and doctrinal approach I set forth below
is certainly not the only applicable approach, it does reflect some dominant
themes in constitutional analysis, drawing on several strands of theory.
The Constitution of the United States is a basic charter of government.
It contains an allocation of rights and responsibilities among branches of
government and among the national and state governments, as well as
substantive and procedural provisions relating to the rights and relations of
government to individual citizens. While the victim's rights amendment
raises important concerns regarding substantive criminal law and federal and
state relations, 7 my purpose here is to examine the issue of federal relations
to individuals. 8
Courts and scholars have largely interpreted the Constitution in light of
determining the relationship of the individual to the government, not the
relationship of the individual to other individuals. Although there are good
arguments that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to the acts
of individuals 9-- despite the Court's adoption of the "state action"
"3See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 301 (1993) (arguing that Fourth Amendment cases illustrate
and reflect "larger" issues in constitutional jurisprudence).
'6See Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current Crises in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 24 L. & SOC. INQ. (forthcoming May 1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 13)
"7See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1998) (arguing that absent from discussion is "a theory of
process--one that concentrates on the proper constitutional roles ofjudges and legislators and
prosecutors and jurors in criminal law choices .... on the significance of federalism, and on
the counter-majoritarian difficulties attending judicial review under the capacious concept of
due process").
"For some arguments against the amendment on federalism grounds, see Law Professors'
Letter I, supra note 11, passim, and Law Professors' Letter II, supra note 1, passim.
"9See Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 403
(1993) ("[H]owever true generally the notion that the Constitution applies only to actions of
the state-the government-the Thirteenth Amendment is an important counter example.").
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doctrine 2-the focus has been on the relation of the individual to the
government. Although the Constitution largely defines the relationship of the
individual to the State in terms of participation in democratic processes,'2 1 it
also includes certain rights of the individual against the State. Even the
Constitution's participation and process allocations cannot be divorced from
substantive normative choice about whose participation matters and why.22
The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment appear to contain
both substantive and procedural commitments to, and restraints, on the
State's power over individuals. These constitutional rights for individuals are
primarily "negative" rights or liberties,2 3 which limit the State's power to
interfere with the activities of its citizens. Overall, constitutional theory and
law have tended to emphasize textual rights and negative liberties over
positive rights 4 despite arguments by progressive and liberal constitutional
scholars that positive liberties and claims against the government are also part
of our constitutional theory and order.' Only in rare instances have the courts
20See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
386-414 (1997) (discussing state action requirement and exceptions): Frank 1. Goodman,
Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1345 (1982) (questioning Brest's argument that "private conduct
involving the exercise of a state-created right is an exercise of state power and therefore 'state
action.').
2'This view is probably best articulated by John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust. See
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 148-78 (1980) (discussing court's use of
Carolene Products footnote to facilitate individuals' involvement in political processes).
22Ely himself makes substantive choices in his arguments that African Americans, gays,
and other minority groups have superior claims against the majority in terms of participation
rights. See Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 137 (198 1) (critiquing
Ely's process theory); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1063 (1980) (same).
23Isaiah Berlin is largely credited for distinguishing between "negative" and "positive"
rights. See ISAIAH BERLIN, INTRODUCTION AND TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY. in FOUR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY 118, 122-34 (1969) (suggesting that "[t]he defense of liberty consists in the
'negative' goal of warding off interference"); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 147, 184-205 (1978) (suggesting that "men have moral rights against the state");
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271. 2342-47 (1990)
(arguing for recognition of positive rights).
24John Hart Ely's acerbic characterization of "fundamental rights" arguments in
Democracy and Distrust includes the quip that fundamental rights theorists edge towards the
door when someone mentions positive rights to food, jobs, and shelter. See ELY, supra note 2 1,
at 43-72 (1980) (discussing how Supreme Court discovers fundamental values).
25See Frank T. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969) ("Yet I hope to make clear that in many instances
[the Court's] purpose could be more soundly and satisfyingly understood as vindication of a
state's duty to protect against certain hazards which are endemic in an unequal society, rather
than vindication of a duty to avoid complicity in unequal treatment."); Robin West,
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 643 (1990)
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found that individuals have positive entitlements or claims on the government
in order to ensure meaningful exercise of their rights. For example, in Gideon
v. Wainwright,26 the Supreme Court determined that the right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment and notions of fairness under the Due Process
Clause required states to pay for counsel for indigent criminal defendants.2 7
Occasionally, the Court has affirmed positive entitlements under a procedural
due process analysis when the government seeks to deprive citizens of liberty
or property rights. In Goldberg v. Kelly,28 for example, the Court held that the
government must provide a hearing prior to depriving an individual of
statutorily authorized welfare payments?9 In Boddie v. Connecticut,0 the
Court held that a state could not charge indigent persons a fee before
allowing them to file for divorce, because individuals have fundamental,
constitutionally protected rights in making choices about marriage and
family?' Most of these rulings have involved states trying to deprive an
individual of a specific constitutional or statutory right or entitlement rather
than individual claims that the government must provide a benefit or
32assistance. Indeed, the Court has been extremely reluctant to expand the
duties of government to provide positive rights or entitlements, no matter how
sympathetic the claim.
The victim's rights amendment would be unique in requiring the
government to involve private parties in court proceedings that are not aimed
(suggesting that "progressive constitutionalists... view the power and normative authority of
some social groups over others as the fruits of illegitimate private hierarchy, and regard the
Constitution as one important mechanism for challenging those entrenched private orders").
26372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court required the federal government to provide counsel for
indigent defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-69 (1938).
2"See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (stating that "[t]his noble ideal [of equality before the law]
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him"'). This right does not extend to "petty" offenses or offenses for which a
defendant does not face any actual threat of imprisonment. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
368 (1979) (defendant charged with shoplifting items totaling less than $150); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26 (1972) (defendant charged with carrying concealed weapon).
28397 U.S. 254 (1970).
29See id. at 264 (stating that "when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process").
30401 U.S. 371 (1971).
3 See id. at 382-83.
32Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971) (holding that state cannot
charge indigent persons $60 divorce filing fee), with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
484-87 (1970) (finding that Maryland AFDC regulation that imposes $250 monthly maximum
per family regardless of size or need does not violate Equal Protection Clause).
389No. 2]
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at depriving these persons of life, liberty, or property? 3 In the instance of
victims who are not witnesses to the offense, primarily surviving relatives and
friends of a homicide victim, the amendment gives victims, upon whom the
government makes no demands whatsoever, the right to participate and
attempt to influence the outcome of the government's case. At first this may
seem quite progressive, humane, and unobjectionable, but upon closer
examination, it presents a number of problems?4 The first objection is that
government does not owe duties to individuals. Inconsistent with victim's
rights arguments that the government owes victims something, in constitu-
tional practice, the government has no constitutional duty to recognize many
forms of victimization, including the protection of citizens against private
violence. Second, victims of war, whether soldiers killed in battle, soldiers
injured and traumatized by war, or civilians wrongly interred or injured by
government, have no recognized constitutional claims, although the
government arguably has caused the injury. Victims of racism and prejudice
have no constitutional claims if those who injure them are private parties,
despite the injurious effects of these practices. Thus, there must be some very
special justification for privileging victims of crimes committed by
nongovernmental actors by giving them constitutional rights.
33The Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial in private ("common law") lawsuits could
arguably be characterized as a positive claim on governmental resources similar to the
proposed amendment.
34Certain problems involve structural issues such as a reordering of state and federal
power under the amendment and the effects of victim's rights on substantive criminal law and
practice. Such problems are beyond the scope of this Article, but they raise important concerns.
There are, for example, substantial federalism concerns. See Proposals to Provide Rights to
Victims of Crime: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 71 and H.R. 1322 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 42. 44 (1997) (prepared statement of Hon. George P. Kazen, Chief
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, on behalf of Judicial Conference
of the United States) (arguing that victims' claims, "almost inevitably filed in federal courts,
could cause significant federal court supervision of state criminal justice systems for the
purpose of enforcing the amendment"); see also id. at 48, 50 (prepared statement of Hon.
Joseph R. Weisberger. Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, on behalf of Conference
of Chief Justices) ("It is the position of our conference that the protection of victim's rights
emanates from the general police power of the States. Since the Federal government does not
have this power, it should leave this constitutional issue to the States.").
35See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(finding that -'nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors").
DeShaney has been widely criticized by numerous legal scholars, including this one, but no
real changes in law have occurred in response that would make government liable for failures
to protect. For a thoughtful defense of the no-duty-to-protect argument, see Barbara F.
Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REv.
982, 986 (1996).
3 90 [1999: 38'3
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If the Constitution is concerned with limiting the government's power
over individuals, and does not provide for positive claims on governmental
resources by individuals, what justification exists for an amendment that
grants a certain class of individuals the privilege to demand that the
government provide them with positive rights? Advocates of a victim's rights
amendment generally offer several possible rationales. The first is based on
a kind of social contract analogy: Because the government depends on
victims to make law enforcement possible, it owes them something in return.
The second rationale is that a majority supports victim's rights. The third
rationale is that some kind of basic or fundamental human right entitles crime
victims to participate in the criminal process. A fourth and related rationale
is that the government somehow retraumatizes victims in the criminal
process-that it also victimizes them-and victims ought to have a right not
to be traumatized. The fifth rationale is that participation is, in some way,
therapeutic, and therefore, the Constitution ought to embody and enforce this
therapeutic norm. A sixth rationale is that victims have a right to corrective
justice. Finally, proponents argue that such an amendment is necessary to
offset the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
A. The Argument from the Social Contract
One possible argument for a victim's rights amendment rests on a kind
of social contract theory, perhaps captured in the preamble to Louisiana's
1985 victim's rights legislation:
"In recognition of the civic and moral duty of victims.., of crime to
cooperate fully and voluntarily with law enforcement and prosecutorial
agencies, and in further recognition of the continuing importance of such
citizen cooperation.., the legislature declares its intent.., to ensure that
all victims ... of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and
sensitivity, and that the rights extended ... to victims.., of crime are
honored and protected by the law enforcement, (sic) agencies, prosecutors,
and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protection afforded the
criminal defendants. 36
This appeal to the duty of victims reflects a belief that members of the
polity "owe" cooperation to others as part of their understanding of
community membership and that the community in turn owes them. But the
36Cait Clarke & Thomas Block, Victims' Voices and Constitutional Quandaries: Life
After Payne v. Tennessee, 8 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 61 & n. 144 (1992) (quoting
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1841).
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constitutional concern for negative liberties stems in large part from the
government's monopoly on the use of force and its ability to use the criminal
law to control and punish the population. Whether one grounds the argument
for the social contract embodied in the Constitution on Hobbes, Locke,
Nozick, Rawls, or other political philosophers, 7 the theory is that we cede
our right to exact revenge or restitution to the State and to the law in return
for the State's protection and enforcement of the law. Accordingly, the state
and federal governments of this country hold a formal constitutional
monopoly on the use of force.38 The criminal law, enacted by legislatures, is
part of that monopoly. Crimes are legally defined as offenses against the State
and the community, even if those offenses involve individual victims.
The strongest claim that a victim might make on the government under
this theory, that the social contract gives them a right to be protected from
crime, and to sue if they are not protected, has been rejected by the Supreme
Court9 and by many-although not all-proponents of an amendment"
Rather, in its various incarnations, the amendment has emphasized a right to
participate in governmental decisions regarding charging, custody, sentenc-
ing, and conduct of criminal prosecutions without an enforcement mecha-
nism.
The argument that the social contract creates a duty to report and
prosecute crimes lacks support as well. There is no general duty to report
crimes in many jurisdictions,4 although the government does rely on victims
37See ROBERTNOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 131-32 (1974) (discussing notion
of "social compact"); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 296 (1996) ("Yet Americans had
reason to treat their charters as something more than declarations of preexisting entitlements.
These were not mythic notions like the social contract or the true original contract of
government .... These charters provided a potent authority to which Americans could appeal
whenever the status of their rights within the empire was controverted."); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 520 (1971) (exploring "whether the contract doctrine is a satisfactory
framework for understanding the values of community and for choosing among social
arrangements to realize them").
38However, one could argue that the Second Amendment qualifies that monopoly power.
See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 551-56 (1991).39See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1989) (finding that Due Process Clause did not impose affirmative duty upon State to protect
child from father's abuse).40Proposed amendments have contained language specifically precluding suits for
violations of civil rights since 1996. Professor Cassell makes it clear in his statements that
section 1983 does not apply. See Cassell, supra note 6, at 526-27.
4 I am excluding special reporting requirements for professionals in child sexual abuse
or domestic abuse cases. The duty to report, closely related to the duty to rescue, has never
enjoyed much scholarly support. Among the theoretical and pragmatic reasons for this lack of
support is that a duty to report interferes with individual liberty and autonomy-a negative
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to report and prosecute criminal offenses. It is true that without individual
victim cooperation, the government would be unable to enforce its laws in
many instances. Therefore, the argument goes, government has some special
obligation to victims. It is generally accepted that a number of
crimes-including serious crimes-go unreported. - What effect nonreporting
has in facilitating criminality is unknown, but to some extent, the dependence
on individuals to aid in enforcing the criminal law is empirically true. Many
times, the victim is a crucial witness as well. In nonhomicide cases, it is often
the victim who reports and is a witness to the crime.
That the government relies on citizens to report crimes is not dispositive
of any social contract questions. If the argument proceeds from consent, for
example, citizens who report crimes could easily be said to consent to the
government's processes and primacy in prosecution. If persons were asked
if they would choose such a system ex ante, most probably would have no
trouble delegating this function to government-indeed, why else have a
government? 3 Requiring individuals to bear the costs of prosecution
themselves would create a number of inefficiencies as well as increase the
probability of inconsistent application of the law. Even if first-party insurance
could spread costs, there would still remain major free rider problems.
Further, while there has been some trend towards privatization in criminal
justice, including private security guards and privately run prisons, it is thus
far not at all clear that this is more efficient, helpful to prisoners, or just.
Arguably, by reporting a crime, the individual is choosing, as a moral
agent, to invoke the authority of the State and its institutions against another,
and is thus consenting to the State's control. One could argue that the
individual's consent is either chimerical or uninformed, but the existence of
self-help law enforcement suggests that individuals might, in some instances,
rationally choose not to involve the government.44 Further, some communi-
ties, particularly minority communities, already provide alternative means for
crime victims to seek redress.
rights argument. Practically, of course, enforcement is difficult because it is hard to detect
many omissions, much less find adequate proof to convict someone. There is, however, no
absolute bar on legislatures enacting laws that require reporting.42Hence, the difference between figures in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports and the
National Victim Survey. One difference that remains striking is the reporting of rape.
43Robert Nozick suggests that this "night watchman" function is the most compelling
argument for government. See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 57-87.
4 See Donald Black, Social Control as a Dependent Variable. in TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 1, 7 (Donald Black ed., 1984) (suggesting that "forms of social
control divide into two major categories: those involving only the principals, with or without




Arguments from communitarian concerns suggest alternative framing of
the social contract question as well. By using victims to serve the community
interest in prevention and punishment of crimes, the government could be
said to owe them special treatment requiring recognition of their rights. But
on a more communitarian, or civic republican level, it is not so obvious that
victims are being unfairly used or intruded upon by government. Many have
argued that emphasizing individual rights at the expense of the individual's
duties and responsibilities has been a grave error in political and legal
terms.45 Rights without responsibilities, for example, can undermine the
polity rather than strengthen it.46 By contrast, civic virtue and civic republi-
canism emphasize responsibilities and connections to the community as well
as freedoms and duties. Under this view, victims are not individuals
exercising rights against the government. Rather, victims of crime, as
members of the community, have a responsibility to their community to
cooperate in criminal prosecutions in order to protect and safeguard the
community's interests.
Whether the dependence on victim participation and cooperation rises
to the level of protecting a fundamental right worthy of being enshrined in the
Constitution is not disposed of simply because the government relies on
individual cooperation. If victims are also to be a part of the process, then
either they are state actors or their status as independent parties must be
adequately theorized, but before reaching this question, another community-
interest-based argument, majority will, bears examination.
B. The Argument from Majority Approval
Another common argument made by advocates of victim's rights is that
a majority, or an "overwhelming" majority, "approves" of victim's rights,
however defined.47 If a majority in a democracy supports a certain policy or
4-Michael Sandel's work is perhaps the most influential critique of liberal democracy's
emphasis on individual, negative rights. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE I (2d ed. 1998).
4
6'See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 17 (1991) ("In recent years, we have made great progress in making the promise
of rights a reality, but in doing so we have neglected another part of our inheritance-the vision
of a republic where citizens actively take responsibility for maintaining a vital political life.").
47See The Victims' Rights Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 44 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (1998) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Professor of Law,
University of College of Law) ("[N]ational consensus appears to be developing that the rights
of crime victims deserve protection."). The success of victim's rights amendments to state
constitutions indicates strong public support for "victim's rights," however defined. The
argument that consensus justifies creation of fundamental rights rests largely on conventional
morality, however, rather than any strong rights theory grounded in individual dignity and
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approach, generally there is nothing to prevent it from acting upon that
policy. This power that majorities hold over minorities is one of the major
reasons why theorists and constitutionalists have concerned themselves with
preserving individuals' constitutional rights through negative liberties. Unless
the policies violate constitutional constraints, a constitutional amendment is
completely unnecessary for a majority to implement victim's rights through
legislation.
The democratic process of electing legislators and executives charged
with enforcing the law ensures that the State responds to community and
individual concerns about crime. Further, there is nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits states from electing judges and prosecutors, thereby subjecting
them to public scrutiny and participation in their decisions.
Claims that a majority supports victim's rights generally determine
which specific rights they ought to have under the Constitution. Popular
culture reinforces the majority's sympathy for victims and encourages
unreflective support for victim's rights. Currently, against horrible images of
the Oklahoma City bombing, serial killers, and tearful victims, arguments
against victim's rights lack visual and political punch. The news media keeps
up a steady drumbeat of crime--"if it bleeds, it leads"--and portrays criminal
defendants as unworthy and less than human. Cheap-thrill television shows
such as Cops leave people with the impression that all police officers are
good and all suspects guilty. Television docudramas reinforce a story of
duplicitous defense lawyers, miscarriages ofjustice, and victim revenge. John
Walsh, a major supporter of the proposed federal victim's rights amendment,
can be seen regularly preaching his gospel of rage and revenge in television
autonomy. Conventional morality in turn can mean those moral attitudes all people
unreflectively approve of or moral claims regarded by a majority as unproblematic. The
"Gallup poll" theory of rights, however, rests uneasily with a commitment to strong rights
against the State. See ELY, supra note 21, at 69 ("It makes no sense to employ the value
judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of
the majority."); DWORKIN. supra note 23, at 240-58 ("A conscientious legislator who is told
a moral consensus exists must test the credentials of that consensus. He cannot, of course,
examine the beliefs or behavior of individual citizens .... The claim that a moral consensus
exists is not based on a poll. It is based on an appeal to the legislator's sense of how his
community reacts to some disfavored practice.").
Although majorities can improve their moral understanding and enact that improvement
as a constitutional amendment-the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments can be
characterized as a moral shift in attitude towards African and African-American slaves that was
an improvement-even that question is debatable. The Eighteenth Amendment was quickly
repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment, as the prohibition of alcohol appealed to have the
support of a fragile consensus that quickly broke down.
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spots and on America's Most Wanted.48 In this simplistic world, all the
victims are innocent, and all who are accused of crimes are guilty. As Mario
Cuomo wrote in a law review article, "We must continue to think about crime
victims, because they, we, are the mainstream of our society. To ignore the
needs of crime victims is to ignore the needs of most of our people-the
good, moral, upright, hard-working, social contract abiding majority."'9 To
side with victims is to side with the "good people" against the "bad
people"-often people of color, the poor, and the disenfranchised. In this
simplistic paradigm, politicians and voters find it easy to declare that they are
against criminals and for victim's rights without having to think about the
practical effects of victim's rights on the Constitution, victims themselves, or
individual rights. Because ours is a system concerned in part with protecting
individual liberties from majorities, which are able to enact legislation if they
so choose, a stronger reason for giving some individuals special rights is
necessary.
C. Fundamental Rights Argument
Professor Laurence Tribe, who has long advocated various expansions
of rights, has touched upon a kind of fundamental rights concern in his
writings in support of an amendment. After initially opposing a victim's
rights amendment," Tribe determined that a constitutional amendment
granting rights to crime victims ought to be adopted.' To my knowledge,
48John Walsh's anger is unmistakable; his recent book, No Mercy, boasts on the flyleaf
of the book jacket that rage is the proper response to crime. See JOHN WALSH, No MERCY
(1998) While we hear much of the success of the television show America's Most Wanted in
locating fugitives, and that is not a bad thing, it is unclear if people also have been wrongly
accused as a result. Moreover, we do not know what effect of such programs has on people's
perceptions of crime.
49Mario Cuomo, The Crime Victim in a System of Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 1, 19 (1992) (discussing legislation enacted in New York that enhanced victim's
rights).
5 See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Sen. Christopher
J. Dodd, U.S. Senate 4 (May 30, 1996) (stating that "it seems to me that the proposed
amendment would create a real hornet's nest of problems for law enforcement at all levels, bog
the courts down in enormously complex legal conflicts, shift power over resource allocation
decisions from legislators and executives to judges, leave unanswered many of the questions
in current law that appear to motivate the measure, and achieve no meaningful protection for
victims beyond that already attainable without any constitutional change at all").
51See Laurence H. Tribe, Position Paper on Victims' Rights I (June 27, 1996) (on file
with author) ('IT]he rights in question-rights of crime victims not to be victimized yet again
through the processes by which government bodies and officials prosecute, punish, and release
the accused or convicted offender-are indisputably basic human rights, rights that any
civilized system of justice would aspire to protect and strive never to violate.").
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however, Tribe has not yet developed a coherent statement identifying the
specific source or nature of these fundamental rights, nor has he clarified the
theoretical basis for them. Rather, he has framed his claims on some
unarticulated notion of human dignity to argue for rights to participate in
criminal proceedings, without identifying why there is an autonomy or
dignitary interest unique or strong enough to be recognized by the Constitu-
tion, or what that interest actually is.
The argument based on dignity claims that victims have some sort of
fundamental right that ought to be enshrined in the Constitution. The interest
of the individual is never defined in terms of a grounding for the right, other
than a vaguely Kantian notion that all are entitled to equal dignity and respect
in their interactions with the government and its courts. But such an argument
fails to distinguish crime victims from other victims of wrongs committed by
private parties or anyone else who interacts with the government and courts;
it therefore proves too much. Obviously, everyone should be given equal
dignity and respect.
Doctrinally and historically, fundamental rights involve an individual's
liberty and autonomy to make choices that are rooted in the constitutional text
(freedom of speech or religion), structure (the right to travel), American
history and practice, or in terms of human dignity, autonomy, and personhood
(the right to contraceptives). 2 Again, however, fundamental rights, whether
explicitly in the constitution's text or implied from that text, tend to be
individual rights against government.
One doctrinal touchstone for determining fundamental rights is whether
such rights are "fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty" or grounded
in "our history and traditions."53 This approach does not justify finding crime
victim's rights, as such rights are neither part of our history and traditions nor
fundamental to ordered liberty. 4 A more expansive view that advocates
recognition of fundamental rights is often based on questions of individual
52See Paul Brest, Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064, 1073 (1981) (discussing
"fundamental rights controversy" and sources of fundamental rights).
53See Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan. J.. concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
548-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 640-42
(explaining various approaches to fundamental rights analysis).
54See Henderson, supra note 2, at 938-52 (discussing origins and history of victim's
rights). Tribe makes a weak argument that the framers -undoubtedly assumed the rights of
victims would receive decent protection" in an op-ed piece co-written with Cassell. Laurence
H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July
6, 1998, at B5. Yet, the framers' intent regarding crime victims is hardly clear in any of the
analyses of the founding.
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autonomy and principles of "equal concern and respect."55 Although the
courts have frequently been hostile to expanding the meaning of fundamental
rights based on dignity and autonomy arguments,5 6 the cases and principles
within constitutional jurisprudence might provide a theoretical basis for an
argument for victim's rights5 7 Tribe apparently adopts the position that
victims ought to have positive rights because criminal cases involve some
kind of basic human right that people widely agree deserves serious and
permanent respect.58
At one point, Tribe characterizes the relevant right as the "right not to
be victimized yet again through the process by which governmental bodies
and officials prosecute, punish, and release the accused or convicted
offender," which he sees as "indisputably basic human rights against
government, rights that any civilized system ofjustice wouldaspire toprotect
and strive never to violate." 9 However, if the concern is with honoring
individual concerns about the positive law, it is hard to see why crime victims
alone ought to have special rights in litigation when victims of other wrongs
do not, or why legislatures cannot respond to those concerns in changing
positive law.
Tribe also has made a strong substantive statement in asserting that
"[t]he ultimate concern of the criminal justice system ought to be with the
victim."' Tribe's statement requires a justification as to why the victim's
55The phrase "equal concern and respect' is most associated with Ronald Dworkin's
work, see, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 181, 199. 273, but the argument that victims
deserve to have rights equal to defendants or deserve some form of equality treatment that
Tribe, Feinstein, and many victim's rights advocates assert is very close to a claim that the
criminal process somehow denies victims equal concern and respect regarding some right that
they hold.
6Perhaps one of the best examples of the Courtfs hostility can be found in Justice
White's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 passim (1987).
The argument for individual dignity and autonomy is contained in Justice Blackmun's dissent
in the same case, and it is framed in terms of negative rights. See id. at 199.
5 Professors Laurence Tribe, Ronald Dworkin. and Kenneth L. Karst, for example, are
well-known advocates of dignity-based and autonomy concerns in adjudication of rights. See
generally DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 205 (suggesting that "'Ithe institution of rights
is... crucial, because it represents the majority's promise to the minorities that their dignity
and equality will be respected"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1302-1435 (2d ed. 1988) (supporting fundamental rights based on dignity and autonomy);
Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword-Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 9 (1977) (discussing dignity- and autonomy-based rights under Fourteenth
Amendment).
58See Tribe. supra note 5 1, at 2.
91d. at 1.
6 Online NewsHour, Victims' Rights: Making Amends (statement of Laurence Tribe,




individual interests should trump the community's concerns with crime,
including fair process for those accused, equality in the application of the
law, and the goals of the criminal sanction--deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, and protection. If the trump is some right of the victim, it
remains to be determined what core right is relevant and why.
As an example of the need for victim's rights, Tribe points repeatedly
to the exclusion of victim-witnesses from trials. Tribe argues, based on his
participation in Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia," that victims should
have a right to attend trials, just as the public has the right to attend.62 Yet,
this matter can be, and indeed has been, handled statutorily, and does not
require a constitutional amendment for resolution.63 Tribe also has stated that
"there's a national value that victims ought not to simply be side-lined and
marginalized and not even informed when the person convicted of attacking
them is released." If this is a national value, there is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits adoption of legislation embodying notice to
victims, communication with victims, or various forms of victim participa-
tion.
Tribe has asserted that his position does not involve pitting the rights of
one individual against another, but rather the rights of the victim against the
authorities," presumably adhering to the basic premise that constitutionally
recognized rights are negative rights. Tribe's argument seems forced: If the
concerns of the victim receive insufficient attention from the government,
what are those concerns and why should they enjoy constitutional protection?
According to Tribe, whatever the right is, it is insufficiently protected under
existing constitutional law, including state constitutions. Yet, it is by no
means clear that insufficient concern exists empirically, or even that it cannot
be adequately remedied through legislation.66 Additionally, if insufficient
61448 U.S. 555 (1980).
6 See Tribe, supra note 51, at 2-3 (stating that Richmond Newspaper "illustrates so
forcefully the way in which victims' rights to observe and to participate ... may be trampled
upon ... because the Constitution nowhere refers to the rights of victims in so many words");
see also Cassell, supra note 6, at 486 (advocating victim's rights to attend and to testify at
trial).
63See Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L.
REv. 443 passim (making clear that "statutory protections" for crime violations are preferable
to constitutional amendment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4) (1994) (enumerating crime
victim's rights).
'MakingAmends, Online Newshour Transcript (June 25, 1996) <http://www.pbs.org>.6"See Tribe, supra note 51, at 1; Tribe & Cassell, supra note 54, at B5.
Tribe also argued that giving rights to victims would not distort separation of powers
or federalism. See id. at 3 ("The fact that the states and Congress ... already have simple
affirmative authority to enact rules protecting these rights ... is not a reason to oppose
amendment altogether."); Tribe & Cassell, supra note 54, at B5.
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attention to victims exists, as Tribe seemingly asserts, despite state constitu-
tional amendments and a plethora of victim laws, merely adding language to
the Constitution will not produce commitment to change either.67
Some of Tribe's concerns, as well as those of other advocates of the
amendment, are with the appearance of fairness and due process for victims.
These people argue that victims have been harmed and ought to have some
special participatory rights that enable them to tell courts what they think and
how they feel about their cases. Professor Mosteller has labeled this the
"participatory" rationale for creating constitutional rights for victims.68
Puzzlingly, if victims have a fundamental right to participate, they ought to
have a right not to participate as well. A victim can be traumatized and denied
autonomy and choice when forced to prosecute, which, under current law,
can and does occur.69 Yet, Tribe nowhere addresses a right not to be coerced
into cooperating.
Further, in terms of participation in the formation and adoption of laws,
including legal rights and remedies, victims are hardly in need of special
constitutional protection. The success of victim interest groups in changing
law through the democratic process cannot be denied: No one can argue with
a straight face that legislatures and representatives have been deaf to victims'
concerns about sentencing, probation, parole, and defining substantive
offenses. Victims are hardly a persecuted group or a discrete and insular
minority whose participation in the process has been blocked.
To give victims a meaningful, rather than a symbolic, right to partici-
pate further as individuals in criminal proceedings requires more justification
than has been offered. An extremely individualized criminal justice process,
in which we create fundamental rights for individuals to use the power and
resources of the State to pursue their own ends, would require greater
justification and thought than Tribe or anyone else has provided. No serious
scholar or practitioner would advocate a return to reliance on private
prosecution and enforcement of the criminal law for a number of reasons, not
the least of which is the need for consistency, certainty, coherence, and equal
application of the criminal law. The privatization of criminal law seems ill-
advised, as it would introduce more, not less, discretion into the system.
"6See Tribe & Cassell, supra note 54, at B5. This is true since most versions of the
proposed amendment do not provide victims with meaningful ways to enforce their rights.
"8See Mosteller, supra note 63, at 458-63 (suggesting that victims already often
participate to some extent in criminal proceedings).




D. The "Avoiding Trauma to Victims" Argument
Another reason given by victim's rights advocates to justify a constitu-
tional amendment has been that the process often "retraumatizes" them. This
assumes that all crime victims suffer from trauma. While the current
limitation of the proposed amendment to victims of violent crim6 ° seems
facially to include only those who have suffered extreme trauma, the degree
of trauma even violent crime produces is quite variable. Moreover, to the
extent that having to talk about the crime causes trauma, it is unclear how one
could structure the legal process to avoid trauma.
A developing body of research indicates that many victims of extreme
trauma, whether directly or indirectly, as with those who survive the killing
of a loved one, do face the sometimes-overwhelming task of recovering from
the trauma. Some never recover. Others recover quite rapidly. It is the case
that feelings of anger, fear, betrayal, loss, mourning, guilt, shame, helpless-
ness and hopelessness, isolation from others, numbness, and denial are all
common reactions to violence and extreme trauma generally?' No one single
feeling or emotion necessarily predominates in most victims-that is, victims
may feel rage at one moment and terrible grief or fear the next. Trauma also
can affect a victim's perceptions and behaviors after the event. The effects
of trauma can render victims, particularly close to the time of the trauma,
exquisitely sensitive to the reactions and actions of others, including police,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges. After a traumatic event, a victim's
perceptions of and sensitivities to danger and betrayal are magnified, so that
victims may perceive even the best-intentioned actions or statements from
others as betrayals or assaults; anything that is less than sensitive to the
individual's experience can be perceived as a major problem with "the
system." In the context of criminal prosecutions, where the adversary process
emphasizes winning and losing, anything, no matter how neutral, can be
perceived as helping the offender at the victim's expense.
Trauma might lead victims to want to speed up the process-to get it
over with-in the hope that somehow this will make the anguish go away.
Conversely, victims may want to slow down the process in order to gain some
70See S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999) (limiting constitutional amendment to "victim
of a crime of violence").
7 See generally JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 237-44 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing physiological and social effects of violence against women); see also DEBORAH
SPUNGEN, HOMICIDE: THE HIDDEN VICTIMS 17-61 (1998); Henderson, supra note 2, at 956-64
(describing psychological impact of violent crime on victims); Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting
Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 589-90
(1998) [hereinafter Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion] (stating that violent crimes "'cause a
number of psychological harms").
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distance and relief from pressure. For some victims, notice about hearings
may rekindle trauma. For others, notice may provide feelings of predictability
and control that offset the feeling of helplessness many experience. While
legal procedures might indeed be triggers for reliving the trauma, other things
also can trigger such flashbacks-a sound, a sight, a place, a smell. Thus, it
is not particularly easy to attribute trauma to the legal process alone.
Building a criminal process around these difficulties, particularly
because we still lack empirical information on how the legal system can best
avoid increasing the trauma victims suffer, seems ill-advised, in light of other
important concerns. For example, according to one author, many families and
friends of murder victims transfer their anger to the defense attorney!' Surely
the rage at defense lawyers ought not be the basis of depriving defendants of
effective assistance of counsel, even if it is entirely understandable.
Moreover, it is not only the criminal process that is traumatic for vic-
tims-natural disasters and torts can produce extreme trauma73 Both involve
interactions with government agencies and, in some instances, courts, that
"retraumatize" victims through unresponsiveness, bureaucratic delay,
criticisms of, or attacks on, the victim's character and claims, and so forth.74
Again, we are left with the question of what is so special about crime victims,
who exactly is traumatized by the process, and how.
E. The Therapeutic Rationale for Victim's Rights
One of the humane impulses behind the victim participation rationale is
that the victim's trauma ought not be made worse by inattention. Another
claim is that giving victims rights is somehow therapeutic. While telling the
story of victimization may be part of recovering from trauma, this does not
relate to many of the proposals for victim's rights, and therapeutic uses of
narratives may not easily translate for legal proceedings.
After I testified against the adoption of a constitutional amendment in
1997,75 several supporters of the amendment approached me. They wanted to
tell me the stories of their loved ones' murders and murderers, of prosecuto-
rial errors, of beliefs the killings should have never happened but for failures
72See SPUNGEN, supra note 71, at 47 (stating that many victims, or friends and relatives
of victims, feel anger toward police).
73See id. at 99-100, 110.
74For a stunning example of loss. wrongdoing that was covered up, threats, legal
malfeasance and bungling, and trauma to survivors in a toxic torts case, see JONATHAN HARR,
A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
75See Hearings on S.J Res. 6. supra note 9, at 75 (statement of Lynne Henderson). The




in the system, and their support of the amendment. They seemed like nice
people who wanted the public to know of their suffering. But these mothers
of murder victims were from California, a state that has twice amended its
constitution in the name of victim's rights. 6 Indeed, California has been far
from neglectful of victims' concerns in the past fifteen years. In California,
victims have rights to notice, participation at sentencing, consultation on plea
bargains, restitution, and so on." Preventive detention exists, as do harsh
sentencing laws. Yet, at least these victims were no "happier" for it-perhaps
because law alone cannot take away the trauma, and identifying rights invites
the question of which individuals are to enjoy these rights by virtue of their
status as "victims."
Identifying who should be able to tell their stories is not easy. Both the
trauma argument and the therapeutic rationale assume that the status claim of
crime victim and trauma is noncontroversial. As self-evident as this initially
appears, particularly if the amendment remains applicable only to victims of
violent crime, it is not really so obvious. If harm is the deciding factor, then
drawing lines becomes difficult, and pressures on legislatures to expand the
definition of a "victim of a crime of violence" may be strong!8 The line
between an individual victim and the larger community blurs when the issue
of what Spungen terms "co-victimization" '79 arises. The expansion of victim
impact statements to include testimony of family members and people who
were close to the deceased in death penalty cases-testimony that includes
the effects of the murder on the survivors-ought to make it clear that lines
cannot easily be drawn in other cases where the impact of the crime affects
others close to the victim or who witnessed the offense. Co-victimization
occurs when a violent crime has a traumatic effect on one other than a
statutorily defined victim and undermines community safety and security.
Even identifying "family members" in homicides as those who count as
victims is not self-evident: changing concepts of families, extended family
relationships in some subcultures, house mates, lesbian and gay couples, and
intimate friends all render a simplistic limitation on the claim of harm to
76See Henderson, supra note 2, at 937-38. 953 n.87 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I §§ 12,
28(c)).
77See CAL. CONST. art. I §§ 12, 28(c).
78S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999). For example, residential burglary is an offense that
requires no personal violence whatsoever. Yet, it is considered a very serious felony, and the
intrusive and invasive aspects of the crime produce considerable trauma for many victims.
79See SPUNGEN, supra note 71. at 8-10. "'Co-victim" is the term Spungen applies to
people traumatized by a homicide, primarily immediate family and friends. Id. at 9. Spungen
takes careful note of the myriad circumstances of homicide beyond our stereotypes, recognizing




members of the immediate, so-called nuclear family difficult to justify.
Neither is co-victimization limited to homicides nor a homicide victim's
survivors. Witnesses to terrible crimes suffer trauma, and family, friends, co-
workers, and partners suffer trauma when a loved one is raped, robbed,
seriously assaulted, or kidnaped. Children growing up in homes where
domestic violence occurs can suffer harm even if they are not themselves
physically assaulted."0 Should they all count as victims entitled to speak their
minds? And what of the effects of crime on many communities, as in those
"high crime" areas where people suffer from living in the equivalent of a war
zone?
The lines blur even more in cases of victims who are also offenders. The
example most often cited recently is that of the battered woman who fights
back and is charged with assault or murder of the batterer' Battered or
abused children are victims but can also become perpetrators against other
children or against their parents. Gang members can be almost simulta-
neously perpetrators and victims, as are prostitutes, drug dealers, drug
addicts, alcoholics, and anyone who fights back with more than necessary
force against an assault. Many of these scenarios involve individuals who
qualify both as victims who would be entitled to rights and as defendants
against whom rights could be asserted by their victimizers in order to
continue abusing and controlling them.
The stark delineation between who does and does not count as a real
victim becomes even more complicated: At what point should victim status
attach? At the time the crime is reported, or only when charges are filed?
Under the current amendment, victim's rights come into being upon the arrest
of an offender, leaving a number of victims' and co-victims' interests
unaffected. Under the current proposal, it is not all clear that rights continue
once the prosecution determines not to proceed. Rape provides an illustration
that this can undermine whatever promise the amendment holds out to
victims. While several proponents of the victim's rights amendment have
8 Some argue that the effects of "child witnessing" can be as damaging to children as
physical abuse of children. See, e.g., Alan J. Tomkins et al., The Plight of Children Who
Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 137, 144 (1994).
H"See, e.g., Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, supra note 9, at 77-78 (statement of Donna F.
Edwards) (stating that victim's rights amendment would adversely affect battered women who
are themselves charged with crimes); id. at 168, 170 (statement of NOW Legal Defense Fund)
(stating that constitutional guarantees afforded to criminal defendants are just as important-if
not more-to battered women accused of striking back because batterers can use the
amendment to retaliate); Letter from Chris Whipple, supra note 8, at 3 (expressing concern that
Victim's Rights Amendment may affect personal safety of domestic violence victims when
prosecuting offenses against abusers).
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opined that rape victims will be better off under the amendment because they
will be treated more sensitively,82 there is absolutely no ground for this
assertion. What it takes to remain a real rape victim is not influenced at all by
this amendment. Rape cases remain very difficult to prosecute even under the
best of circumstances. Given the skepticism that exists about the veracity of
rape charges-and the mixed evidence as to whether the rate of false
reporting of rape is higher than other offenses-a woman who is a rape
victim may not be able to persuade authorities that she is indeed a victim,
much less see her case reach the point where a constitutional right attaches.83
Moreover, nothing substantive in the amendment does anything to change the
bias against rape or child sexual abuse victims that permeates the law and
reality of these cases.84
There is some evidence that participation in court and legal proceedings
may enhance a victim's evaluation of her experience. Professor Tyler's work
suggests that people feel the legal system is legitimate if they are listened to
by authorities. But perceptions of fairness are complex; moreover, Tyler's
study did not focus on criminal law per se.85 Nevertheless, being responded
to in a positive way seemed to affect perceptions of fairness. Part of positive
responding includes an authority's listening to the person's complaint,
explanation, or story. A right to tell one's story to decision makers whose
decisions have emotional and personal effects on the individual does seem
only fair, if the criminal process is the only opportunity the victim has for
speaking to legal authorities. It would appear to be a humane gesture, as Tribe
believes, at least at first glance.86 But when victims ought to tell their stories
and why may not relate to the current scheme of the amendment, which
2See William T. Pizzi, Victim's Rights: Rethinking Our "Adversary System."" 1999 UTAH
L. REV. 349, 355-56.
3See generally David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194 passim (1997) (discussing screening of rape complaints
and evidence supporting rape myths in certain situations).
X4See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 17-46 (1998) (stating that despite
reforms, rape victims still face discrimination in criminal justice system); Lynne Henderson,
Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 479 passim (1997)
(describing difficulties of bringing child abusers to trial and evidentiary problems at trial);
Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and In Fact 2 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 41 passim (1993) (describing history of sexual stereotypes and its contribution to sex bias
in rape law); see also Byden & Lengnick, supra note 83, passim (discussing bias in rape law
assumptions and situations in which bias may evidence support).
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 143 (1990) (stating that people's
perceptions of fairness depend on how decisions affect their interests and how legitimate they
believe system to be).
86See Tribe, supra note 22, at 1068-71 (noting constitutional value of allowing
individuals to seek redress from courts as persons rather than objects).
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focuses primarily-although not exclusively-on custodial hearings. Senate
Joint Resolution 3 gives victims the right to be heard and to submit a
statement in bail hearings, plea hearings, sentencing hearings, and parole
hearings. 7 None of these proceedings necessarily invites the telling of the
whole story, and it is absolutely unclear how many times in the criminal
process it would be necessary for victims to be allowed to tell their stories for
therapeutic value. Related to this is the question of the weight that authorities
ought to give such statements.
The provisions of the current version of the Amendment are mostly
silent on the reasons for victims presenting statements in court at-that is,
what the relevance and substantive effects of those statements should
be-and what procedures ought to be followed in permitting those state-
ments. It seems doubtful--or remains to be proved-that victims would be
content to make statements knowing that they would have very little, if any,
legal effect. Without proper grounding for victim's rights, knowing what
substantive meaning they should have becomes difficult. Without substance,
the rights become meaningless and merely symbolic.88
The one substantive factor provided for in some versions of the
amendment involving custody determinations is "consideration for the safety
of the victim in determining any conditional release." 9 This provision may
mean that the victim's story is relevant only as far as it concerns evidence of
direct threats or possible retaliation by the accused, but it also could
encompass a victim's statements of psychological or emotional distress if the
accused is released, even if the accused presents no danger to the victim or
the community. On the other hand, victims might state that they feel
completely safe. The proposed amendment does not indicate the weight
courts should give the victim's opinion, unless the weight derives from other
portions of the amendment. If the victim opposes release of an accused before
trial, ought that be determinative in denying bail? Section 3 of Senate Joint
Resolution 3 indicates that exceptions to victim's rights may exist only if
87See S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
"Professor Robert Mosteller has documented a trend in the various formulations of the
proposed amendment away from victim participation towards enhancement of prosecutorial
concerns. See Mosteller, supra note 63, at 454 & n.29 (suggesting that amendment's focus is
on prosecutorial issues and that amendment is likely to be of merely symbolic import to
victims); Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the Constitution: Moving From Guarantee-
ing Participatory Rights to Benefitting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1053. 1058-64
(1998) [hereinafter Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the Constitution] (stating that, under
Amendment, -rather than taking power or resource from government and giving it to victims.
the taking is from defendants").
89 S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
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there is a "compelling interest."90 Given the usual constitutional application
of the compelling interest test, virtually no justification for denying victim's
rights will likely pass muster. If a victim's safety is a compelling state
interest, then virtually no defendant would be released from custody if the
victim objected. Whether the State had to demonstrate compelling reasons not
to release offenders when victims advocate their release is not obvious either.
Some of the amendment's proponents suggest that victim, impact
statements are cathartic and healing. Further, a narrative of pain and
suffering, of rage and terror, of life before and life after is something many
victims-although hardly all-may want to tell courts and juries. For
example, Professors Pizzi and Perron argue that in Germany, victims can
have their own attorneys and participate both as witnesses and co-prosecutors
in a narrow category of serious offenses.9' Pizzi and Perron note that few
victims avail themselves of the right except, interestingly, in sexual assault
cases.' They go on to observe that a primary goal of a criminal trial may be
"to provide a cathartic and beneficial effect for victims,"93 presumably sexual
assault victims, as few others avail themselves of the opportunity. If so, "such
benefits will more likely accrue to victims in a system that not only permits
them to tell everything they know about the crime in their own words, but
actually prefers such testimony to that which has been shaped and prepared"
by lawyers.94 They cite no support, however, for the claim of catharsis.
Pizzi and Perron acknowledge that the German system is quite different
from the American one, but the suggested inference that the German system
is "better" for crime victims is inescapable. It is not clear, however, that the
authors present a convincing empirical argument that German procedure is
less stressful95 or that victims are happier with the way their cases proceed
and are resolved in Germany than in the United States. First, the authors do
not discuss victim satisfaction with the process. In addition, the German civil
law system combines the tort action with the criminal case, is nonadversarial,
does not involve juries, and uses judges as investigators as well as decision
makers, making comparisons difficult. Given the enormous differences in the
laws and practices of the two countries, it would, of course, be very difficult
to make absolute cross-cultural comparisons of this type. Yet, one could at
least design studies of victim attitudes, experiences, and emotional well-being
901d. § 3.
9'See William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37, 54-59 (1996).
92See id. at 58-59. They do not explaih or speculate as to why this is so.
931d. at 44.
941d.9SSee id. at 45-47.
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in the United States and Germany to determine if trauma is higher and
satisfaction lower in the United States than in Germany. Only then could we
say with any assurance that the system is less traumatizing to victims.
The persistence of the notion that testimony is cathartic is utterly
unsupported by empirical evidence. In fact, some disagree that telling a
trauma narrative aids victims of extreme trauma to heal at all.y Claiming that
allowing victims to tell their stories in full without interruption or questioning
mistakes the purpose and reason for trauma narrative in therapeutic contexts
as fungible with the purpose and reason for trauma narrative in a legal and
fact-finding setting. The purpose of narrative in therapy is to enable people
to understand the experience, come to terms with the loss, anger, grief, fear,
and isolation caused by trauma, and integrate the experience into their lives.
Telling the story over and over may be required as the victim integrates the
experience over time, and the narratives might change substantially as old
issues are resolved and new ones surface.97 Therapists should not be
detectives demanding proof or verification of factual statements, nor ought
they sit in judgment of a client or the perpetrator. Therapists ought not tell
clients what they ought to do in most instances, although they can offer
advice and support in helping the client make decisions about responses.
Similarly, the role of support groups for victims is not to tell victims what
96See Stevan M. Weine et al., PTSD symptoms in Bosnian refuigees 1 year after
resettlement in the United States, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 562, 562-64 (1998) (stating that
.'common wisdom is that it is not helpful to tell trauma story, but study of 'testimony therapy'
found helpful to twenty Bosnian survivors of ethnic cleansing"). Testimony therapy involves
a long and careful process of telling the trauma narrative. See HERMAN, supra note 71, at
176-87. The persistent Hollywood version of the one cathartic telling that produces complete
recovery is completely inaccurate. The most recent version of this may be illustrated in the film
Good Will Hunting; after a breakthrough and admission that he had been horribly abused as
a foster child, we are led to presume that the hero will no longer be violent or act out as he
drives into the sunset to -'see about a girl." GOOD WILL HUNTING (Miramax 1997). Herman
writes,
This image of catharsis, or exorcism, is also an implicit fantasy in many trauma-
tized people who seek treatment. It is understandable for both patient and therapist
to wish for a magic transformation, a purging of the evil of the trauma. Psychother-
apy, however, does not get rid of the trauma. The goal of recounting the trauma
story is integration, not exorcism.
Id. at 181. Dr. Lenore Walker notes that
it is dangerous to make any unilateral conclusions about how testimony impacts
on women violence victims. Clinical data from the field makes it clear that for
some women, testifying is a horrendous experience and sets back their healing but
for others it is wonderful and saves several years of psychotherapy. It seems to
depend on the attorneys, the court, the victim herself, and the opportunity to feel
empowered no matter what the outcome of the legal case.
Personal communication from Lenore Walker (Mar. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
97See HERMAN, supra note 71, at 214-36 (recounting various group therapy sessions).
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they ought or ought not feel, think, or do. Rather, support groups should
provide a safe place to share their stories, experiences, and strategies for
coping and healing with others who have like experiences.98 Law demands a
quite different approach to narrative-even trauma narrative.
The essence of law includes judgment, and reaching judgment involves
normative evaluations as well as factual ones. In legal settings, the purpose
of the victim's narrative is not to provide therapy or catharsis, but to aid
understanding and evaluation of facts and circumstances relevant to the legal
matter. Even a free-form narrative of the type Pizzi describes is open to
interruption, questioning, and evaluation.99 What may be emotionally very
relevant to the victim, the victim's story, or the victim's experience may not
hold any particular legal importance to the issues at hand. The anguish of the
trauma narrative does not seem relevant to many hearings that might effect
a defendant's release from custody, such as suppression motions which in
theory could lead to suppression of evidence and release of the offender. The
fear or rage the victim may feel toward the defendant does not mean that the
defendant's rights should be denied.'00 In addition, it may be harmful to
encourage victims to speak of trauma in an unstructured way in court:
Empathic listening is of course part of good judging, but judges neither are
nor should be therapists.'
Accommodating victim narratives to lessen trauma in telling would
require radical changes in the law of crime, criminal procedure, and evidence,
constructing a proceeding in which an uninterrupted free-form statement may
take place. Under current law, at a minimum, the proceeding must be one in
which the guilt of the defendant is not at issue and the rules of evidence do
not apply. Otherwise, the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause should
apply, as should the rules of evidence.0 2 Grand jury proceedings might
provide one possible vehicle for telling of the trauma story without interrup-
tion. The defense is not present and cannot cross-examine the victim-witness.
"See id. at 218 (stating that group therapy can provide sense of safety during early stages
of recovery from traumatic events); SPUNGEN, supra note 71, at 159-64 (stating that group
therapy's purpose is to provide safe haven for freely discussing feelings).
'See Pizzi & Perron, supra note 91, at 42-44 (noting narrative style of testimony taken
by German courts).
'See Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion, supra note 71, at 581-89, 597-601
(discussing role of rage in victim's rights movement).
'"'See Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy. 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1575-77
(discussing importance of empathy for judges and lawyers). Empathic listening should not
necessarily trump other concerns ofjustice and fairness, or even empathy with defendants. See
id. passim; ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 205-07 (1997).
' Of course, if the victim's interest in making a statement can only be limited by a:
compelling interest, it is unclear how the balance against the defendant's right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses would be struck. See infra Part II.G.
No. 2]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
But one must be cautious here, too: If the prosecution in a given jurisdiction
learns exculpatory evidence through the victim's testimony, it must disclose
this to the defense. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the grand jury transcript
may be available to the defense in future proceedings. Moreover, grand jury
members may question witnesses. In doing so, they may ask things the
victim-witness finds hurtful. For example, since rape shield laws would not
apply, a victim could be asked intrusive questions about her sexual history
and behavior; a victim might find such questioning traumatic.
Another possible point in the process for the free-form narrative is at
sentencing. 13 Most states and the Federal government already allow victims
to appear and participate at sentencing and at parole hearings, and all states
allow victim impact statements. Sentencing hearings formally give a victim
the chance to tell at least some of her story and to share with officials the
nature of the experience and the degree of impact it has had or is having to
the extent that it is relevant to the imposition of the sentence. All states
provide for restitution to victims, and the harms they suffer may be relevant
to the extent restitution is defined. At the same time, the role of the victim in
determining an offender's sentence remains open to challenge. I" Further, if
the victim (or the victim's family) puts her character into issue, the defense
can and should challenge the characterization, if possible, when it can affect
the sentence or the amount of restitution."'
The relevance of victim impact statements to most issues of sentencing
still presents difficulties with the free-form narrative approach. Under current
practice, the individual does not determine the sentence of the offender; the
judge (or jury) does under sentencing rules adopted by the state legislature.
Of course, nothing precludes taking the victim's concerns into account in
determining sentences if a legislature so chooses, but what concerns ought to
be relevant and why remains to be determined. If we wish some degree of
consistency of punishment-a major reason for the enactment of the Federal
' 3See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial. 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 863,
864, 878-79 (1996) (examining use of victim impact statements at sentencing).
4See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 198-201 (1995) ("[Tlhere is a danger that informal testimonials by the angry and
aggrieved could generate excessive sentences serving primarily the need for revenge."); Donald
J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint. 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233
passim (1991) (discussing benefits and disadvantages with victim's role in sentencing, and
proposing limitations on victim's role); Susan Bandes, EmpathY, Narrative, and Victim Impact
Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 passim (1996) (arguing against use of victim impact
statements in capital cases).
11
3See Randall Coyne, Avoiding Payne: An Analysis of 'ictim Impact Evidence, 8 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 65, 76-80 (1992) (discussing defense obligation to investigate
victim's character and family in capital cases).
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Sentencing Guidelines-then standards for what harms to the victim are
relevant must be consistent as well, and not subject to the whim of a
particular victim or judge. As Donald Hall's research suggests, the use of
victim impact statements could "result in uneven sentences for similarly
situated defendants."'' 16 Vague standards, such as California's use of
"vulnerability of the victim" as an aggravating factor under determinate
sentencing, invite normative evaluations of victim worthiness that we may not
wish to promote."0 7
F. The Right to Corrective Justice Argument
Assuming that we can properly identify who is a victim and who is not
for purposes of legal claims, surely those identified victims can assert a right
to corrective justice. Victims have been harmed in some way by an offense,
and the person who harmed them ought to be held accountable. Putting aside
the complexities of determining the nature and applications of corrective
justice, currently we have two basic legal mechanisms for achieving it. The
tort system is supposed to provide for correction and compensation for harms
to individuals. Tort law usually only requires proof of harm and proof that the
defendant caused the harm. The victim controls the litigation and the trial as
the plaintiff; her story, injuries, and damages are the focus. Perhaps because
civil litigation is expensive and time consuming, and few have the resources
to sue their assailants, together with the fact that many-but hardly all-who
are guilty of criminal offenses are essentially judgment-proof, the focus of
corrective justice has shifted to the criminal process. While frustration with
the tort system is understandable, these practical realities do not necessarily
justify victim participation in criminal prosecution under current theory and
practice in the United States.
There are many differences between the concerns of tort and those of the
criminal process. The State and the community are negatively affected by
crime, and the criminal law is the community's response.'0 8 In criminal cases,
"(Hall, supra note 104, at 257; see also id. at 246-47 (stating that victims have different
view of effectiveness of victim impact statements than judges and others in criminal justice
system).
" 'See Bandes, supra note 104, at 362-82 (arguing that "l[v]ictim impact statements
permit, and indeed encourage, invidious distinction about the personal worth of victims");
Henderson, supra note 2, at 992-94 (stating that assessing victim's behavior in sentencing
would put victim on trial). But see David D. Friedman, Should the Characteristics of Victims
and Criminals Count?: Payne v. Tennessee and Two Views of Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C.
L. REV. 731, 741-43 (1993) (asserting that microeconomic and moral arguments of victim
worthiness are relevant and desirable).
'["See Henderson, supra note 2, at 1009-10.
No. 2]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
it is the State and the community that bear the burden and expense of
identifying, prosecuting, punishing, imprisoning, and executing offenders.
Individuals do not bear these expenses beyond their contributions as
taxpayers to the funds that support all prosecutions. (The individual victim
or victims may, however, bear the costs of missed work, child care, and
transportation to attend court or meet with authorities.) The criminal process
is more concerned with whether a defendant ought to be held culpable and be
punished for committing the offense, and the reason for that emphasis is
largely one involving moral calibrations of blameworthiness and concerns
with rationales for inflicting pain or punishment on the offender. These
considerations have little to do with the actual effects on the victim.
The different interests and concerns of the State and the victim in
criminal law may be the reason that George Fletcher's view of victim's rights
suggests a severance between the victim and the State in terms of determining
moral culpability." 9 Drawing on the German approach to criminal law, he
argues that the victim only ought to have a right to see her assailant declared
guilty of perpetrating the crime in terms of the act. According to Fletcher, the
State's interest in the criminal sanction takes precedence over victims in the
second stage of the trial, which decides issues of moral culpability". I have
argued elsewhere that the German approach would probably satisfy neither
victims nor victim's rights advocates in the United States."' The approach
certainly guarantees neither perfect nor better results from the perspective of
victim's rights advocates. For example, the light sentence given to the man
who stabbed Monica Seles" 2 may have been an anomaly, but the failures of
the criminal process in the United States so frequently cited by victim's rights
advocates are likewise anomalous.
Although the public (and perhaps many victim advocates) focuses on the
harm caused by a criminal defendant's conduct, harm is not necessarily the
basis for punishment." 3 Generalized concerns of deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation are not necessarily tied to actual harm to
victims. The criminal process is concerned with harm only so far as the
""See FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 180-88, 245-47 (suggesting that juries clarity
acquittal by stating whether defendant's act is criminal because it violated victim's right and
whether defendant is accountable for act).
"'See id.
..See Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596.
1605-06 (1996) (reviewing FLETCHER, supra note 104).
See Johnette Howard, Home Alone: Her Attacker Walks Free, But Monica Seles Still
Lives in Troubled Isolation, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 10, 1995, at 44.
"'See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of the Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498-1507 (1974) (arguing
that harm focus oqerlooks important concerns in criminal law).
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definition of the crime includes a harm; we punish many offenders even when
the substantive crime does not involve physical harm to a victim, and even
though the crime might entail an emotional harm such as fear and might
further be classified as a violent crime. For example, the crime of robbery
generally does not depend on the use of force, but the threat of force that
places a victim in fear. In other crimes, the force may not be aimed at the
victim at all-picking pockets is forcible, but only in the sense that physical
action is required to take the wallet from the unsuspecting victim. The current
amendment's term, "crime of violence,"" 4 would probably include attempted
murder or other attempted violent crimes; yet, attempts do not require that
any harm occur. Assault with a deadly weapon does not require a resulting
physical harm. Burglary requires no harm whatsoever, although it is
traditionally considered a very serious crime.
The effect of a serious crime on an individual often ought not be used
to determine the degree of punishment. For example, the fact that a rape
survivor copes well with her experience and suffers little or no post-traumatic
stress is not a reason to say that the crime is not among one of the most
serious offenses against the person and ought to be punished accordingly.
Similarly, a robbery victim may not be physically injured and may be quite
resilient emotionally, but that does not mean that robbery is a trivial offense,
or that the victim is less a victim than one who suffers from severe post-
traumatic stress disorder as a result.
G. Offsetting the Rights of Defendants
Another argument for victim's rights is that the victim's rights can be
balanced against, or, better yet, trump, the defendant's constitutional rights.
By trotting out a list of rights enjoyed by the accused, supporters of a victim's
rights amendment gain a politically effective and graphic argument for such
an amendment. A list of rights for the accused (usually including only the
hated Bill of Rights provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, but not the ex post facto, bill of attainder, or habeas corpus
clauses in the Constitution) is held up and juxtaposed against the absence of
any specific rights for crime victims. Senator Diane Feinstein, a co-sponsor
of the amendment in the Senate, frequently refers to this list. The injustice of
granting rights to criminals who do great harm and not to victims is
rhetorically and visually powerful. Lost in the picture is the notion that the
Bill of Rights provisions exist because of our commitment to a liberal-rights-
based democracy rather than an authoritarian system, that the provisions may
1
4 S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
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serve as brakes against governmental abuse of citizen's rights,"5 and that
such rights may exist to protect minorities against majority tyranny."6 If
rights are not to be merely fanciful abstractions or symbolic tokens, some
form of recognizing these rights is essential."'
The amendment's advocates, however, argue that the "rights of the
victim" are at a minimum to be "balanced" against the defendant's rights to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to receive Miranda
warnings, bail, ajury trial, and the right to confront adverse witnesses. How
this balance is to be struck is left unclear---"courts balance rights all the time"
is hardly an answer to concerns about the effects of the amendment on the
defendant's rights. At least some Justices and judges are adverse to any
balancing of rights." 8 Further, the argument that victim's rights are necessary
for balancing fails to recognize that courts already balance the rights of
defendants against the interests of the State in criminal procedure, often to the
State's benefit." 9 Finally, the most current version of the amendment
provides that the government can abridge victim's rights only if there is a
compelling state interest. This suggests, at a minimum, a desire to place a
thumb on the scale against defendants when balancing does occur.
Two aspects of the victim's rights proposals suggest that victim's rights
are meant to trump defendant's rights as well as governmental interests in
criminal cases. First, the addition of requiring a compelling interest to
override a victim's rights shows an intent for victims to trump defendant's
"See Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, supra note 9, at 45 (statement of Roger Pilon) (stating that
Constitution's purpose was to limit federal government).
"
6
The "Madisonian paradox" of individual rights in a majority rule society has, of
course, been discussed at length. See supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text; Donald J.
Hall, Victims' Rights Amendments to Constitutions: Proceed with Caution, 27 VAND. LAW.,
Jan. 6, 1997, at 14-15 (quoting Justice Hugo Black's statement that constitutional rights are
aimed at "protect[ing] the weak and the oppressed from punishment by the strong and the
powerful").
"'See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 289 passim (1995) (proposing that constitutional rights should be enforceable
irrespective of state law or congressional authorization).
"'See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1178-80 (1989) (arguing that while balaficing factors may have appeal it is "[m]uch
better... to name a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of
the decision"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword--The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 24-27, 60-62 (1992).
"9Although the State has no "right" to a fair trial, this does not mean that the Court does
not take the State's interests seriously in balancing those interests against the rights of the
accused. For example, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the majority noted that
"[t]he substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule.., have long been a source of
concern" in balancing, while holding that there is a "good faith" exception to the warrant
requirement. Id. at 897-907.
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rights. Second, the drafters' refusal, thus far, to add language providing that
the amendment shall not detract from a defendant's constitutional rights also
indicates an intent for victim's rights to trump. The argument that victim's
rights are meant to undermine the rights of defendants is well developed
elsewhere. 2 Thus, this discussion presents only a brief summary of those
arguments. On the other hand, no one, to my knowledge, has examined the
possible effects of the proposed victim's rights amendment on the First
Amendment, and this section will briefly examine possible First Amendment
concerns.
1. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
Much of the support for the victim's rights amendment comes from
those who decry the Warren and Burger Courts' decisions interpreting the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Particularly vexing to many are the
exclusionary rules that prevent introduction of evidence obtained in violation
of a defendant's constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Cassell has long waged a battle against the Mirandd2 rule,
which occasionally leads to the suppression of evidence of confessions.'
""See Henderson, supra note 2, at 968-86 (stating that victim's rights reforms may only
deprive defendants of rights without satisfying needs of victims); Robert P. Mosteller, Popular
Justice, 109 HARV. L. REV. 487, 487-88 (1995) (reviewing FLETCHER, supra note 104); see
also Jeff Brown, Origins and Impacts-Proposition 8: A Public Defender's Perspective, 23
PAC. L.J. 881, 881-87 (1992) (stating that California's reforms "nullified a long standing body
of California law painstakingly crafted to protect the rights of the accused").
"2'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"Compare Paul Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions-andfrom Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 503 (1997) (arguing that
Miranda does nothing to protect innocent accused, but only may help "career criminals ... to
avoid interrogation"), and Paul Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-
Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1055,
1059 (1998) (stating that after Miranda, police solved cases at lower rates), with Richard Leo
& Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell,
88 J. CRiM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 558 (stating that Cassell's argument that Miranda hurts
innocent has "no empirical foundation"), Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect:
Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 506-15
(1996) (criticizing Cassell's reliance on old, flawed studies), Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda and
Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 278, 280-87 (1998) (arguing that "Miranda's burden on
law enforcement is much lower now than in immediate post-1966 period" and that Miranda's
costs, "if any, are justified by the constitutional mandate"), and John J. Donohue III, Did
Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1147, 1153-71 (1998) (criticizing
Cassell and showing that Miranda has post-1966 statistical significance only for larceny and
overall crime clearance rates).
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Professors Pizzi, Amar, and others likewise condemn exclusionary rules and
the adversary system more generally. 
2
Hatred of the Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence (or the
adversary system) masked as support for victim's rights is cynical in the
extreme, 124 as are the claims made about how these precedents and
protections of defendants' rights lead to massive injustice.'25 In these
arguments, empiricism plays no role: Evidence that the reasons for the rules
are sound or that the effect of the exclusionary rule on most cases is minimal
or nonexistent does not fit with the belief system that criminals are regularly
turned loose on legal technicalities.'26 Critics of constitutional criminal
procedure believe it impedes what should be the primary purpose of criminal
1See AMAR, supra note 13, at 158 (stating that presumption of innocence "dip[s]
heavily in favor of the defendant"); Henderson, supra note 2, at 982-86 (discussing both sides
of debate about benefits and costs of exclusionary rules); Pizzi, supra note 82, at 356-63
(stating that adversary system creates problems because its goal is to find winner, not truth);
see also J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The Victims'Bill of Rights: Where Did It Come
From and How Much Did It Do?. 23 PAC. L.J. 843, 843-45 (1992) (decrying failure of
California's Proposition 8 because of criminal justice establishment).
'24See Henderson, supra note 2, at 1020-21 (stating that nonvictims are unable to hear
a victim's story without "translat[ing] ... the anguish of victimization into a condemnation of
the offender"); Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion, supra note 71, at 591 (noting that victim's
rights supporters channel victim's rage "into an attack on judges, defense lawyers and
defendants"); Kelso & Bass, supra note 123, at 942-53 (explicitly stating that California's
Proposition 8 meant to overturn California Supreme Court's interpretations); Grover C. Trask
II & Timothy Searight, Proposition 8 and the Exclusionary Rule: Towards a New Balance of
Defendant and Victim Rights. 23 PAC. L.J. 1101, 1105 (1992) (stating that California's
Proposition 8 showed that voters perceived courts as "over-protective ... of criminal
defendants").
"See Henderson, supra note 2, at 942-53 (discussing agenda of recent victim's rights
supporters); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW,
JUSTICE & POLICING 208, 208 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (1996)
[hereinafter THE MIRANDA DEBATE]; Steven J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect:
Substantial Benefits and Vanishing Small Social Costs, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra, at
191, 194 (stating that studies showing injustice of Miranda are flawed); George C. Thomas,
Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady State" Theory of Confessions, in
THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra, at 236, 237 (arguing that Miranda had little effect on
confessions).
121"Cassell's readers are accustomed to a steady stream of speculative accusations that
Miranda causes tens of thousands of suspects to escape conviction every year. See Leo &
Ofshe, supra note 122, at 558.
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proceedings: the search for truth.'27 This view, of course, overlooks the valid
and competing concerns that are embodied in the Bill of Rights.
2
1
Several scholars who advocate victim's rights in the United States have
a distinct preference for the civil law system of criminal procedure. For
example, Fletcher roundly condemns the adversary system, including various
defense tactics and jury trials. 129 Yet, some evidence exists that individuals
in civil law societies would prefer an adversary system, 3 that exclusionary
rules operate in those systems, 31 and that victims can be and are questioned
sharply and harshly at times.13 1 Without massive changes in our constitutional
law and practice, eliminating juries, cross-examination, rules of evidence, and
defense lawyers is impossible. Before we ditch our traditions, we would need
a great deal more information than has been provided thus far.
Victims and victim groups are also beginning to recognize that fair
procedures and honoring constitutional rights are important to victims as well
as defendants.3 3 Beth Wilkinson, one of the prosecutors in the Oklahoma
City bombing cases testified that the victims' families and surviving victims
'27This "search for the truth" rationale is one that has gained ground in the literature
about constitutional criminal procedure, particularly from conservatives generally skeptical of
exclusionary rules. For example, Akhil Amar makes the argument that the Bill of Rights
provisions were only intended to aid the search for truth in criminal trials. See AMAR, supra
note 13,passim.
2'See Bandes, supra note 14, at 1372 n.5, 1391 (stating that "the presumption of
innocence, evidentiary protections, . judicial integrity, and the control of governmental
misconduct are all societal interests"); Henderson, supra note 2, at 983 (stating that "knock on
the door at night [by police] is just as threatening to existence as the nighttime burglar");
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 passim (discussing value
of Miranda to individual autonomy, judicial and prosecutorial integrity, and law enforcement).
129See FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 177-258.
130See TYLER, supra note 85, at 156 (stating that "American legal procedures seem very
responsive to people's desires" when compared to European procedures).
.3 See CRAIG M. BRADLEY, Overview, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE xv, xix
(1999) ("A right against self-incrimination at trial, and against involuntary confessions, is now
generally enforced, and the use of an exclusionary rule to force police to obey rules governing
searches and interrogations is increasingly being used in most of the countries discussed in this
book. Miranda-type warnings are also widely required.") (footnotes omitted); Craig Bradley,
The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1032, 1036-37 (1983) (noting that
American exclusionary rule is no mere aberration because it exists, albeit in different form, in
Germany as well).
'32See Pizzi & Perron, supra note 91. at 63 (stating that rape cases in Germany often
entail "demanding and sustained questioning of the victim by the defense attorney").
.33See Letter from Chris Whipple. supra note 8, at 2-3 (stating that victim's rights




uniformly asked me and the rest of the prosecution team to do two things
on their behalf. First, prove to them and the jury that the defendants were
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .... Second, they asked us to prosecute
the cases in a fair and just manner so that the convictions would be upheld
on appeal.
34
Victims are also often citizens, and as citizens, all have an interest in
limiting governmental intrusion and abuse of power. A victim one day may
be a defendant the next, and thus has an interest in fairness and due process
that extends beyond the immediacy of the case in which she is a victim.
While "winning at all costs" may be part of the American psyche, so is a
concern for fairness. While resentment of criminals being turned loose on
technicalities is very real, for vast numbers of us, constraints on government
intrusions are equally important.'35 Ask African Americans how many times
they have been stopped by police solely for the crime of "driving while
black." Ask any Latino or Latina who is a citizen how he or she feels about
the demand for a green card from authorities, and a more complex picture of
attitudes emerges.'36
Another myth that operates throughout the victim's rights literature is
that criminal cases are endlessly delayed, usually but not always by wily
defense counsel, and the victim "cannot heal" or "put the matter behind her"
until there is a final judgment of guilt. This assertion is questionable, because
healing takes place whether or not an offender is ever located, much less
convicted. Nor does the healing process necessarily end with the successful
resolution of a case. Nevertheless, numerous versions of the amendment have
contained a right for the victim to have a "final resolution" of the case "free
13Testimony of Beth A. Wilkinson Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Proposed
Victims' Rights Amendment (Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.senate.gov./-judiciary/
32499bw.htm> [hereinafter Wilkinson Testimony].
1
35When I was in private practice, I noted that my upper-middle-class clients arrested for
driving under the influence were often incensed that they were not immediately given a
Miranda warning. When I pointed out to them that the officers had not yet asked them any
questions, and therefore did not have to Mirandize until they did, they were baffled.
1 The question of racial bias via police "profiling" has created a controversy recently as
well as calls for empirical studies of a practice that appears to have strong anecdotal support
as well as law enforcement denials of ethnic and racial bias. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Police
Profiling Debate: Acting on Experience, or on Bias, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1999, at A21
("Profiling-the use of race and ethnicity as clues to criminality-is at the heart of Federal and
state investigations .... It is the subject of bills pending in Congress and dozens of state
legislatures ...."); Venise Wagner, ACLU sues to ban race-based traffic stops, S.F.
EXAMINER, June 4, 1999, at A6 (discussing action by ACLU on behalf of Latino attorney




from unreasonable delay.' 37 At a minimum, the vision driving this provision
is that defense lawyers routinely obstruct and delay the process by asking for
frivolous continuances, filing frivolous motions, and being out-and-out lazy.
Although the current proposed victim's rights amendment provides for
consideration of the interest of the victim that any trial be free from
unreasonable delay, the term "trial" could include retrials, if necessary, in the
(unlikely) event of a reversal of a conviction on appeal. In addition, given that
occasional reversals necessitate retrials, does "any trial without unreasonable
delay" cover post-conviction appeals and habeas corpus actions, or does it
simply apply to the initial adjudication of the offense?
The impact of the "freedom from unreasonable delay" clause on
defendants' rights is far from clear. If it applies only to proceedings leading
to initial conviction and sentence, it remains unclear whether it means that
victims can oppose all defense requests for continuances. There are at least
perceived tactical advantages for the defense in delaying a case: wearing
down the other side, allowing evidence to grow stale, and allowing witnesses
to forget or disappear. Nonetheless, there are legitimate reasons for delay as
well: proper investigation and preparation of serious felony cases take time.
When public defenders stagger under sixty to one hundred or more felony
cases a year, the choice is either inadequate representation or allowing time
to prepare and investigate on a shoestring budget. The same can be said for
many district attorneys' offices: 38 inadequate investigation and preparation
can lead to pressure to deal, which can lead to losing cases that perhaps could
have been won. Forcing a case to trial can also lead to hasty prosecution and
conviction of innocent people. Lazy lawyers exist, and perhaps the "reason-
ableness" language would allow judges to ferret out instances of dilatory
tactics while recognizing the genuine need for time. Yet, judges already have
great authority over granting continuances and extensions, and, in my
experience, most seem to have no trouble exercising that authority. We do not
need a constitutional amendment to enhance that power.
Another important individual right, the right to freedom of expression,
and a "group" right, freedom of the press, may also be affected by the
proposed amendment. Even if it is not obvious initially, the proposed
amendment does raise First Amendment concerns, to which this Article now
turns.
' See, e.g., S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997); Proposal for a Constitutional
Amendment to Provide Rights for Victims of Crime, Hearings on HI Res. 173 & 174 Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7 (1996).
"'I am grateful to Professor George Fischer for reminding me of the fact that many
district attorney's offices have inadequate resources.
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2. The First Amendment
The First Amendment and its protection of freedom of speech and of the
press seldom appear as villains in arguments for victim's rights. Deborah
Spungen, who in her book on working with the survivors of homicide victims
gives short shrift to the importance of other Bill of Rights provisions-much
less any explanation for why victims ought to appreciate the value of those
provisions-devotes an entire chapter to the media. She states, "The media
are responsible for inflicting a second wound on the co-victim almost as often
as is the criminal justice system." '39 Nevertheless, the chapter indicates that
the importance of media interests outweighs almost any victim concerns with
intrusion, mischaracterization, harassment, and pain, not only in terms of
existing law, but also in the author's apparent normative vision of the First
Amendment. But if retraumatizing victims is a strong reason for giving them
constitutional rights, then victims ought to have rights to prevent the media
from intruding in their lives, "mischaracterizing" them or their loved ones,
publishing their names and addresses, and so on.
Although Governor Cuomo expressed outrage at the Supreme Court
decision striking down New York's "Son of Sam" Law, which would have
mandated that all profits from a high profile killer's published account of his
crime be paid to the victim's survivors,14 and although at least some rape
crisis workers and rape victims vigorously oppose disclosure of rape victims'
names, despite the Supreme Court's decision to the contrary, 4' to my
knowledge, everyone apparently concedes some primacy of the First
Amendment. Perhaps this is because the "public's right to know" about crime
is considered to outweigh victim's privacy concerns, although the public's
interest in public prosecutions would seem an equally strong concern.
Perhaps because the amendment doesn't concern defendant's rights
directly-and, realistically, the press is usually not sympathetic to anyone
accused of a crime-advocates of the amendment have not argued for a
balancing of victim's rights against the rights of the press or free speech
rights of others. Nevertheless, balancing is a method used in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and throwing victim's rights onto the scale arguably
could create an argument that a victim's concerns with privacy and escaping
139 SPUNGEN, supra note 71, at 224.
140See Cuomo, supra note 49, at 15-17 (calling Simon & Schuster v. New York State
Crime Victim's Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991), "a setback to the Progressive enhancement of
victims' rights").
'4'See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 525 (1989) (holding that Florida law
prohibiting publication of sexual offense victim might be constitutional in some instances, but
truthful publication of victim's name obtained lawfully protected by First Amendment).
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trauma justify a balance against freedom of the press or freedom of speech.
This might be true in the case of "Son of Sam" laws, where the victim's
constitutional right to restitution could be used to sue those few defendants
who publish their stories, as well as authors who work with offenders to write
"true crime" articles and books for profit.
The realization of the victim's rights amendment depends in large part,
of course, on substantive and procedural legal changes that would have to be
instituted after the amendment's passage. Realization of those rights also
depends on whether there is any meaningful enforcement mechanism, an
issue that Susan Bandes discusses in this Symposium... and that others have
addressed elsewhere.'43 However, another important factor to consider is
whether victims will have a right to counsel under the amendment, as
representation in legal proceedings affecting constitutional rights would
appear to be of vital concern in our legal system. Issues of representation
raise real theoretical and practical concerns, to which I now turn.
III. THE PRACTICALITIES OF REPRESENTATION FOR VICTIMS
Both George Fletcher and William Pizzi have dismissed any major
concern that victims ought to have a right to counsel by noting that in
Germany most victims choose not to have counsel but rather allow the
prosecution to represent their interests.'" In the United States, where lawyers
play a much more central role in our conception of fair legal process, it is not
clear that victims would, not seek representation. If victim's rights are indeed
meant to be a corrective to the rights of defendants, then there must be a
meaningful way to exercise those rights. If victims are to have constitutional
rights specific to being crime victims, questions of who should represent
them ought to be resolved. Victims who are indigent or poor are unlikely to
receive private legal representation, and many middle-class victims are
unlikely to have the resources to hire lawyers. Independent legal representa-
tion of some victims and not others would increase the lottery aspect of the
criminal justice process generally and might exacerbate differences in how
'42See Bandes, supra note 40, at 335.
'43See, e.g., Hearings on SJ. Res. 6, supra note 9, at 76 (statement of Lynne Henderson)
(arguing that statutes providing funding for victim programs are better than constitutional
amendment); id. at 166-67 (statement of National Network to End Domestic Violence) (stating
that amendment would require significant implementing legislation); Mosteller, Victims 'Rights
and the Constitution, supra note 88, at 1053 (arguing that amendment provides only
prosecutorial benefit).
'"See FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 167-69 (discussing Sixth Amendment protections);
Pizzi & Perron, supra note 91, at 54 n.76 (stating that only 20% of eligible victims choose to
participate in German trials).
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victims are treated. As defendants have the court-created right to counsel,
surely if victim's rights are to be a corrective to defendant's rights, victims
should be entitled to counsel to represent them in court.
Proponents seem to assume that prosecutors can and will adequately
represent victims, but the potential for conflicts of interest and additional
burdens on prosecutors is great. For example, the State has interests that may
diverge, from the victim's in criminal cases, and it is not altogether clear
whether it is desirable to require the State to assume representation of a
victim's interests. This is true even if it is the case that in most instances
prosecutors have strong incentives to work with victims and attend to their
concerns. Before we allow an expansion of discretion in the criminal justice
system by means of an ad hoc, unpredictable emphasis on the individual
victim's demands and concerns, we ought not to assume that, in Cassell's
words, "the Victims' Rights Amendment assumes a prosecution-directed
system and simply grafts victims' rights onto it."'45
For example, Beth Wilkinson testified that the prosecutors in the
Oklahoma City bombing cases against struck a plea bargain with Michael
Fortier-a man who knew of the defendants' plans and failed to take steps to
prevent the bombing--despite the fact that many victims probably would
have opposed the deal."6 The prosecutors felt that his testimony was critical
to the case, but because of grand jury secrecy rules, they could not tell the
victims why they determined to make a deal for his cooperation.47 Under the
proposed amendment, the judge would have had to hear objections to such a
bargain; if the judge agreed with the victims' objections, "[s]ignificant
prosecutorial resources would have been diverted ... to pursue the case
against Fortier and [prosecutors] would have risked losing the
evidence.., that only Fortier could have provided."' 48
Prosecutors represent the community's concerns and interests in
deterring and punishing crime. Prosecutors have an ethical duty as well to
ensure that justice is served. As Wilkinson's statement suggests, justice in a
given case does not always mean charging a defendant with the most serious
offense, proceeding without being able to prove a case beyond a reasonable
doubt, or demanding the most severe sentence. Similarly, justice does not
mean dropping charges or arguing for light sentences, no matter what the
victim wants. Rather, a balancing of resources, factual issues, and experience
comes into play in prosecutorial decision making.
'45Cassell, supra note 6, at 502.





Coordinating prosecutorial efforts with victim concerns is, of course,
part of good lawyering, but to the extent we consider representation to be
client-centered, prosecutors have neither the duty nor the ability to represent
a victim independently of the demands of the State. Rather, the prosecution
is likely to try to sway the victim to its side and to cooperate with its version
of the case, not the other way around. As a tactical matter, the prosecutor may
not want the victim to tell authorities about certain things or open up avenues
for the defense. A victim may not understand the prosecutor's desire not to
provide the defense with free discovery, and may resent it, but if the
prosecutor is to be successful, the victim's interests may have to be subordi-,
nated to the State's.
Some advocates of the amendment point to feminist law reforms as
examples of the need to have a federal victim's rights amendment. These
advocates argue that until the needs of rape and battering victims were
brought to public attention, violence against women was ignored by the
public and prosecutors.'49 For example, they take the feminist insight that
rape trials frequently "revictimized," or at least placed the victim on trial, and
then generalize to a "need" for victim's rights.5 ° Yet, massive rape law
reform accomplished by feminists in alliance with crime control conserva-
tives has in no way been dependent on whether victims have constitutional
rights, nor can the failure of law reform to expand the prosecution of rape be
attributed to a lack of rights.'5 ' In rape cases, law enforcement, prosecutors,
juries, and courts, together with cultural norms, determine whether a woman
is a rape victim or not. 52 Further, rape survivors and prosecutors may
frequently be at odds with one another about whether and how to prosecute.
If controlling prosecutorial discretion in rape cases-or in any serious felony
case-is a goal of victim's rights, it would be more logical to regulate that
discretion directly in order to have consistency and coherence. Yet,
1
49
See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 8-26 (1987) (discussing evolution of public and
prosecutorial responses to rape); see also supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
'The classic article arguing that rape trials unnecessarily revictimize rape survivors is
Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1977).
The feminist concern with gender bias and crimes against women does not necessarily
entail endorsement of eliminating procedural protections for defendants or crime-control-
supported evidentiary changes. For two strong feminist critiques of changes in the Federal
Rules of Evidence allowing past bad acts evidence in sexual abuse trials, see Katharine K.
Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevance in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV.
563 (1997); Aviva Ovenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in
Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGs L.J. 663 (1998).
'5 See id. at 81-91.
'32See id. at 8-26; Henderson, supra note 84, passim.
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prosecutors face serious conflicting demands and constraints on time and
resources.
15 3
The complexities of requiring prosecutors to honor victim's rights while
representing important state interests are well illustrated by the clash of
values and interests in relationship violence cases. 5 4 Feminists have worked
long and hard to have legislatures and judges understand that relationship
violence is serious and treat relationship crimes no differently from other
assaults, rapes, batteries, kidnapings, and similar crimes of violence. At the
same time, there has been much work to have women in abusive relationships
take actions to end the violence, either by leaving, obtaining restraining
orders, or prosecuting offenders. Individual victims, however, often do not
want their assailants to be prosecuted; in the past, police and prosecutors used
the victim's recantation as a reason not to treat these cases seriously. Now,
many jurisdictions require arrests and have some form of mandatory
prosecution policy. Although I do not condone forcing victims to cooperate
with the prosecution in most instances, if only because of real questions
concerning further trauma and loss of control, it is nevertheless important to
take account of arguments in favor of such mandatory cooperation.
A thoughtful article by Cheryl Hanna, a former prosecutor, argues for
mandatory prosecution of batterers and highlights the tensions and conflicts
between desirable state policy and the individual victim's desires.5 Hanna
found that in the cases she handled as a prosecutor, the battered woman
wants the abuse to stop, and to that extent, she may cooperate with the
state, but she may not want to see the batterer punished for his behavior.
She will often resist contributing to a criminal record, jail, fines, and other
punitive results for her partner. Her fear and mistrust of the criminal
justice system may be even greater than her fear of the batterer.
'Prosecutors in the United States enjoy enormous discretion in deciding which cases
to prosecute. Some of this discretion results because prosecutors are faced with high numbers
of cases. and time and cost constraints. This discretion also results from the managerial and
organizational structure of any given office and some with the individualistic nature of the
justice system. See generally DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A
YOUNG D.A. passim (1990) (discussing conflicting issues in prosecutor divisions); Bryden &
Lengnick, supra note 83, at 1246-54, 1315-51 (same); David T. Johnson, The Organization
of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order, 32 L. & Soc'Y REv. 247 passim (1998) (same).
"'1 prefer the term "relationship violence" to "domestic violence" for several reasons.
First, it has always struck me that the term domestic violence is oxymoronic. Second, violence
between intimates or partners occurs outside of state-sanctioned marriage: It occurs in dating
relationships, cohabitant relationships, and lesbian and gay relationships.
'5SSee Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849 passim (1996).
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Thus, given the freedom to fashion outcomes, most women would
choose counseling and diversion before punishment.
156
Hanna suggests several reasons why female victims of relationship
violence do not wish to prosecute their assailants. Financial considerations,
such as dependency on the man for economic support, affect the woman's
wish to prosecute.'57 She may be reluctant to prosecute because she feels
responsible for the punishment or the abuse. She may be subject to control-
ling behavior and threats from the abuser, or she might fear his retaliation . 5
Fear of losing custody of children may also be a factor. As Hanna notes, the
tendency to drop prosecutions of batterers reinforces marginalization of
women's concerns, thereby perpetuating gender bias.'59
Another important reason for reluctance to prosecute cannot be
overlooked and has nothing to do with additional coercive behavior by the
man. Victims of battering may love their partners and want safe connection
to them."6 Maintaining connection to others, hope that things will improve,
and genuine care can lead to wanting the behavior to stop without much
desire to punish the person who has behaved badly. It is easy to call this
"false consciousness," but anyone. who has been in a close relationship or
marriage to someone they have loved finds it difficult to separate, even if the
relationship is irreparably damaged, whether it be by adultery, alcoholism, the
death of a child, or other tragedies or difficulties. Even so, it still may be the
case that the prosecution should proceed with the criminal case, regardless
of the victim's interests and concerns.
Hanna observes that prosecutors do not let other victims refuse to testify
even if the victims believe that they have more to lose than gain by testifying
in cases involving gangs, organized crime, and rape.'6' She asserts that
prosecutors similarly ought not allow battered women to refuse to
cooperate.'62 Thus, if necessary, a battered woman should be forced to
'561d. at 1884.
'See id.
'See id. at 1884-85.
'59See id. at 1885.
6'See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 29, 52-56 (1989)
(noting that "[w]omen who have been battered tell stories that include fear .... love ....
desire for connection... and absence of options," and that law should assist in maintaining
safe connections); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images ofBattered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 20-24, 52 (1991) (describing ways in which women in
battering relationships seek to preserve connection as part of answer to question, Why didn't
she leave?).




cooperate with the prosecution, up to and including being jailed herself for
refusing to appear after she has been subpoenaed.
6 3
Hanna argues that aggressive prosecution of domestic violence cases
could be effective in signaling the seriousness of the offense, leading to
deterrence and proper punishment." Allowing battered women to refuse to
participate in prosecutions undermines the State's important interests in
prosecuting violent criminals, preventing revictimization of women and any
children involved, 65 and ending the cycle of violence that may occur in these
relationships."6 If batterers know that prosecutors will not prosecute, women
may be in more danger than if they are forced to cooperate. 67 Police will not
investigate cases carefully or take relationship violence seriously if prosecu-
tors will not pursue the cases.'68 Failure to prosecute leads the State back to
being a silent partner in condoning relationship violence as well, 69 something
that reformers have worked hard to eliminate.
The goal in these cases, therefore, is not necessarily "to put the victim
at the center"'70 or to make the victim the ultimate concern of the process.' 7'
Rather, as Hanna contends, the goal of mandatory prosecution "is to punish
the batterer in order to protect potential victims via deterrence and, presum-
ably, incapacitation.''
7 2
Other difficulties with victim representation are more subtle. District
attorneys are not likely to be forthcoming about their biases and cynicism
towards victims, at least not to the general public. Yet, biases in judgment
about victims exist. Being only human, many prosecutors--even those who
are not burned out or incompetent-care for some victims more than others,
do not see all victims as sympathetic, and do not work effectively with all
victims. Victims may be ambivalent about prosecution, they may oppose
prosecution, or they may not care to prosecute, leading prosecutors to feel
frustrated or at odds with victims.
Prosecutorial biases and judgments against victims can lead to unequal
representation of their interests. For example, Professor Abbe Smith relates
'63See id. at 1894.
'"See id. at 1890.
'65See id. at 1895.
'66See id. at 1896.
16'See id.
'68See id. at 1893.
16'See id. at 1897.
17
0
FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 188-201 (stating that victim ought to be at center of
prosecutions during guilt determination process).
7 'See Tribe, supra note 22, at 1067-72 (discussing different concerns of adjudicative
process system).
172Hanna, supra note 155, at 1870.
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the difficulties of finding a lawyer to represent a lesbian victim of a horrific
crime in a case she eventually took.73 She found that locating a knowledge-
able criminal lawyer in the jurisdiction with appropriate feminist sensibilities
who also could deal with victims of extreme trauma was not easy. 74 She
writes: "One prospective lawyer burst into tears upon seeing the surviving
victim in her hospital room. This behavior was not helpful. It did not
engender confidence."' 75 Although Professor Smith's account involved a
search for private counsel, prosecutors faced with a victim of extreme
violence might very well do the same thing. Many prosecutors would be
uncomfortable working with a lesbian woman or a gay man. At the other
extreme are lawyers or prosecutors who are so disenchanted with the
profession, harshly judgmental, or unaffected by the pain of others that they
denigrate or dismiss victims out of hand.'76
Even well-trained prosecutors can do more harm than good if they
become over-identified with the victim. An impulse to rescue, for example,
can lead to a sacrifice of critical judgment and loss of perspective, and
therefore such sympathy is not necessarily good for the victim. By taking
over for the victim, prosecutors can console themselves as heroes, but in the
process deprive the victim of autonomy and choice. To see oneself as a
champion of victims is dangerously self-righteous and can lead to promises
that cannot be fulfilled. Outside of the context of the world prosecutors
know-what evidence they need, what the legal issues are, who the defense
lawyer is, what judges they will be working with, and so on-they are ill-
equipped to deal with trauma victims except as any conscientious attorney
would.
I am no saint, and perhaps that is why I feel so strongly that one must be
very careful in working with victims. In my formal and informal contacts
with victims, I have found that there are some who bring out an urge to attack
them for no apparent reason. (Often, these are persons who have been
severely traumatized.) This urge, an identification with the perpetrator, is not
uncommon in those who work with the trauma victims. The invitation to
impatience, anger, or blame that I perceive or project is, of course, one that
"See Abbe Smith, On Representing a Victim of Crime, in LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow
& Martha Minow eds., 1996).
174See id. at 149.
'I1d. at 154.
'76Distancing oneself from the pain of victims is not exclusive to prosecutors. This
phenomenon is not unknown among those who are caregivers who deal with death and horror
on a regular basis. I once heard the reaction of Stanford Medical School residents to the
stresses of long days and nights and human suffering in the emergency room captured by their




I try to resist when I become aware of it. Yet, this commitment to resist such
anger does not mean that I have noble thoughts or that I do not sometimes
communicate a message of impatience or hostility. I have found that there are
others whose rage overpowers me and still others whose passivity makes me
want to scream, "Do something! Anything!" In other instances, the urge to
rescue and take over the victim's choices and experience is very strong.
Additionally, the stories of other victims often trigger my own memories and
issues. I am much more comfortable seeking refuge in my role as a law
professor or lawyer than in facing stark pain; working with victims even in
short-term crisis counseling is demanding work.
The same phenomena I have experienced have been observed in care
givers working with trauma victims, and it is probably the exceptional
layperson or therapist who does not escape these episodes of what is termed
"countertransference."'' The skills of a therapist or counselor working with
victims of extreme trauma require training, study, and practice. Therapeutic,
empathic listening is not an easy skill to master when faced with extreme
trauma. Therapists, as all others, can become overwhelmed by the horrors
that the client relates or may identify with the perpetrator in a way that
further damages the client. Sometimes working with people who have
suffered extreme trauma traumatizes the counselor. For instance, Judith
Lewis Herman and others who specialize in treating trauma victims are
adamant in emphasizing the point that therapists cannot do the work without
support. The same is true for crisis counselors or anyone who works with
trauma: One can easily become overwhelmed and may need others to consult
with and provide support.17 Prosecutors or attorneys who are not aware of
the phenomenon or who avoid the trauma victim in order to avoid the painful
feelings involved can do considerable damage to victims, to themselves, or
to cases. Further, the duty of prosecutors to ensure that justice is done-that
a case be effectively prosecuted--can create a role conflict between being a
lawyer representing the State and a caregiver to victims.
Many prosecutors are socially conservative and reflect the attitudes and
biases of the larger society. As elected officials, district attorneys may reflect
the biases of the electorate towards those considered deviant, and, as trial
lawyers, deputy district attorneys may argue that there are cases that will fail
because of perceived social and juror bias. They may not identify with,
understand, or be willing to credit crime victims who are not white and/or
middle-class, who are immigrants, or who are female. The devaluation of
177Id.
'78See HERMAN, supra note 71, at 153 ("[N]o one can face trauma alone. If a therapist
finds herself isolated in her professional practice, she should discontinue working with
traumatized patients until she has secured an adequate support system.").
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African-American victims even in serious cases is well documented, and the
role of prosecutorial discretion in permitting this devaluation cannot be
overlooked.'79 The devaluation of female victims is also well documented,
and prosecutorial discretion and lack of zeal for cases involving female
victim-witnesses exists as well. And as members of middle- or upper-middle-
class culture, prosecutors are likely to hold certain assumptions based on
class and culture that do not apply to many of the victims of crimes they
prosecute.
Assigning prosecutors the role of victim advocate is likely to cause
stress as they deal with the competing demands of their responsibilities to
others, the requirements of their jobs, and their own feelings about victims.
We need far more information about how district attorneys interact with
victims-what helps and what hurts-and providing them with training
before we ask that they represent the victim as well as the State. This is not
to say that prosecutors ought not treat victim-witnesses well, but treating
victim-witnesses with respect is part of being an effective lawyer, not part of
being an advocate for conflicting interests.
A. Independent Representation of Victims
Because of state victim's rights amendments, some attorneys are now
beginning to specialize in representing crime victims. Not surprisingly, the
nature of the practice, and the role that private attorneys should play in
criminal cases, are not yet clear. Different state victim's rights amendments
and different laws giving victims standing in state proceedings will, of
course, shape the way in which the victim's attorney participates. Thus far,
a victim's attorney can assist the victim in understanding the process and
occasionally act as a liaison with the prosecution or media. Financial rewards,
however, appear primarily to be gained in any civil action that exists. We still
have little empirical information about the way in which such attorneys
practice, the contributions they can or should make, their impact on the
criminal justice system and on their clients, and how they are paid. What
follows, then, are a few anecdotes about victim representation as well as
some cautionary words about this budding industry 80
'79See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 12-28 (1997) (discussing
assumptions about African-Americans and their effect on processes of criminal trials).
'i0 n my more cynical moments, I think of the proposed victim's rights amendment as a
lawyer's full employment act, as the need to litigate issues and to develop a whole new field
of practice will arise if the amendment passes.
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Judith Rowland, a former prosecutor in California, began to specialize
in representing crime victims after having been a prosecutor. 8 ' Author of a
book on using rape trauma syndrome in rape prosecutions,'82 Rowland first
opened a California Center on Victimology. The center dispensed counseling,
walked victims and their families through administrative remedies, such as
applying for compensation, and kept them informed about court
proceedings.83 Eventually, "Rowland began to make regular court appear-
ances, filing friend-of-the-court briefs on behalf of crime victims, speaking
up at bail hearings, and attending sentencing hearings."'84 Rowland believes
in intervening both before trial and after, usually in support of the prosecu-
tion, but there are times when she "does battle with prosecutors,"'85 although
she does not indicate the nature of those battles. Rowland likened her
representation in court as "my laboratory,"'86 and it is unclear what direction
her practice ultimately will take.
At times, as Rowland's story suggests, victim representation may
actually enhance prosecutorial efforts. Prosecutors can make mistakes that
cause unnecessary anguish, and experienced criminal lawyers representing
victims can sometimes rectify or reverse those mistakes. For example, an
experienced prosecutor in a case in which I was tangentially involved called
the victim's family and announced that some important evidence against the
accused would probably be suppressed. The prosecutor was wrong on the
suppression issue; I never knew what prompted her to call the victim's family
and tell them this erroneous interpretation. We found a tactful way to
intervene to point out that the evidence was almost certainly admissible under
the applicable case law, but of course, the matter never should have arisen.
As mentioned earlier, Professor Abbe Smith represented the victim of
an attempted murder by an assailant who killed her lesbian lover. 7 The two
women were camping in central Pennsylvania when a man apparently
followed them and shot them when they were lovemaking far away from
other people.' 88 The survivor, Claudia, was shot five times; she did her best
to rescue her mortally wounded friend, Rebecca, but failed.' The killer, who
had been abused as a child, had been on his own as a teenager, and lived in
"'State Bar of California, State Bar Report: Voice in the Wilderness, CALIFORNIA
LAWYER, May 1993, at 68.
"'See id. at 68-69.
183See id.
1841d.
" Id. at 70.
1861d.
..See Smith, supra note 173, at 149.
See id. at 150.
" See id. at 151.
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the woods, was charged with murder.'90 The prosecution sought the death
penalty. 9 ' Smith describes the district attorney as "a nice guy, open and
nonterritorial," happy to have assistance with the case, and undisturbed by the
homosexuality aspect. 92 Claudia also had many supporters in law enforce-
ment and supportive friends, something not all victims have. 93
At the preliminary hearing, the defense lawyer pursued a line of
questions suggesting that the surviving victim had taunted the man with her
sexuality, apparently in an attempt to develop a provocation theory of the
case. 9 4 The prosecutor did not object to the line of questioning despite
Smith's notes urging him to object to "plainly irrelevant, highly inflamma-
tory, and downright insulting questions."'95 Claudia, the victim, "held up"
under the questioning. In explaining his failure to object to the questions, the
prosecutor later indicated that as it was a capital case, that he wanted to give
the defense some leeway.' 96 Many prosecutors would not give the defense an
inch in such a case, but others would, knowing that death penalty cases are,
indeed, "different"' 97 and that courts may scrutinize such cases more carefully
on appeal. This may lead to a conflict with victim desires, but pursuing the
death penalty also can pose conflicts with victims who oppose capital
punishment, as in Claudia's case.
Smith suggested and wrote a supporting brief for a motion in limine "to
prevent the defendant from cross-examining Claudia about her sexual
conduct with Rebecca before the shooting and from introducing other
evidence about their sexuality. Under the facts of the case, she argued, there
simply was no provocation as a matter of law. 98 I do not know the applicable
interpretation of provocation and passion voluntary manslaughter law in
Pennsylvania at that time, but certainly in an "extreme emotional distur-
bance" jurisdiction, or a common law jurisdiction that emphasizes subjective
factors in voluntary manslaughter, such a defense could not be precluded as
1gcSee id. at 157-58.
'9'See id. at 161.
92Md. at 158.
'93See id.
'94See id. at 159-60.
'9"3Id. at 160.
'9 See id.
"'If one wanted to limit prosecutorial discretion to object to defense questioning in
capital cases, a statute or administrative policy would be more even-handed than reliance on
the abilities of victim's counsel. Perhaps, however, a victim's constitutional rights would offset
the Supreme Court's limited imposition of the death penalty or the setting of standards for
penalty phase trials under the Due Process Clause.
'Smith, supra note 173, at 162.
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a matter of law.'99 Smith concludes that "[a] criminal defendant's 'rights' are
not compromised by an insistence that the defense be based on more than
deep-seated bigotry. No injustice is caused by prohibiting a defense that gives
legitimacy to homophobic violence." ' Although I agree that there is no legal
prohibition on such defenses, the defense has been successful in some cases,
and the issue of disturbance might be very relevant to the penalty phase of the
trial, should the defendant be found guilty of capital murder.
The defendant pled guilty to avoid being sentenced to death. If the
defendant had not pled guilty in exchange for a life sentence instead of going
to trial, being convicted, and having a penalty phase, it is unclear what Smith
ought to have done, given her client's opposition to capital punishment.
Indeed, Claudia was steadfast in her opposition to the death penalty:
She wanted Carr to understand the pain he had caused. She figured killing
him wouldn't do that .... She knew imprisonment would be a terrible
punishment for someone who had lived out in the wild. She wanted Carr
to be shunned and isolated and caged for the rest of his days ... She
wanted him to have to live with himself.2
01
If Smith objected to evidence of extreme emotional disturbance based on
homophobia as a factor in mitigation during a penalty phase, it is unclear
whether her client's interests would have been served or contradicted.
Opposition to the death penalty suggests the potential for victim conflict
with prosecutorial duties and goals. Thus far, victims who have wanted to
testify against imposition of capital punishment have not been allowed to do
so in cases of which I am aware. For example, Marsha Kight, an advocate of
the victim's rights amendment and mother of a young woman killed in the
Oklahoma City bombing case, was not only distressed by the trial judge's
initial order excluding victim's families from the guilt phase of the McVeigh
trial. She also testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that she was
opposed to the death penalty, and it upset her when the prosecution informed
her that she could not testify because of her opposition." 2 Further, at least
one circuit court of appeals has held that the defendant has no right to
introduce evidence that a murder victim's family members oppose the death
'See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1345-46 (1997) (suggesting that subjective standard in extreme
emotional disturbance defense jurisdictions would allow such evidence when applicable).
2"Smith, supra note 173. at 163.
201id. at 161-62.
202See Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, supra note 9, at 70-71 (statement of Marsha A. Kight).
[1999: 383
REVISITING VICTIM'S RIGHTS
penalty in the penalty phase of a capital case. 03 Under the victim's rights
amendment, it would appear that victims would have a right to make
statements opposing the death penalty, unless the courts determine that the
State has a compelling interest in imposing the death penalty. And if capital
punishment becomes a compelling interest, the rights of defendants in death
cases would vanish.
I now turn to an example of successful prosecution that involved no
victim's rights amendments, but that exemplifies many of the positive
elements that victims appreciate in the process.
IV. DIGNITY WITHOUT AMENDMENTS
A number of critics of the amendment have pointed to the fact that there
is no proof that such an amendment is necessary to insure that crime victims
be treated with dignity and respect or that victim's interests cannot be
protected by legislation.204 In this Part, I discuss my own personal experience
of being a victim-witness in a rape case. The purpose is to provide at least
one account as a counter to the many anecdotes of mistreatment proffered in
support of the amendment. It also may strike readers as containing informa-
tion "irrelevant" to the issue of victim's rights: those readers should simply
turn to the Conclusion, although I might note that this very question renders
much of the victim-oriented argument for an amendment irrelevant as well.205
Another point in weaving in personal feelings, the effects of trauma, and the
effects on my life is to illustrate how irrelevant issues of victimization may
be to determinations of guilt in criminal cases. In part, this anecdote
illustrates that many of the things victim's rights advocates say only a federal
constitutional amendment can accomplish actually existed before there were
any such amendments, even in the states.
Although my case is only one among many, I have no reason to believe
I was treated specially or better than victims in cases supported by strong
2 3See Robinson v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1503-05 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that
testimony concerning murder victim's survivors' opposition to death penalty "was calculated
to incite arbitrary response, [and] thus was properly excluded").
2"See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 63, passim; Cassell, supra note 6, at 507-15.
2°50ne of the readers of an early draft of this Article suggested that this Part was
unnecessary unless it was written for "cathartic" (or perhaps exhibitionistic?) effect. I am
skeptical of claims of "catharsis" and certainly experienced none in writing this. In telling my
version of the formal process and its effects, I hope that I am not being exhibitionistic, but
rather as honest as I can be in providing a positive illustration of a process that "worked."
Because I have extensive notes from the time I was assaulted and have recounted the events
numerous times, I have had some control over accuracy in recounting the story that might
otherwise be subject to criticism for faulty memory.
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evidence. The one advantage I did have was that, as a lawyer, I knew the
system. Yet even so, I experienced most of what happened as a human being
who was a victim of a violent crime, not as a person who was a lawyer and
in her role as such. Other victims I have talked with also have related positive
experiences with "the system.20 6 This does not mean that there is no need for
improvement in many cases. Rather, it suggests that the objective of decent
treatment can be and is met without a federal constitutional amendment.
In the fall of 1981, I began to feel that I was singled out for a crime
wave. In the course of a little over a month, I was a victim of a number of
crimes. In the first instance, I was standing in court gathering my papers after
a hearing when I was struck in the back by the outraged mother of my
client.2"7 A while later, my wallet was stolen, presumably when a strange man
bumped into me. Next, someone tried to break into my home at night while
I was there. I filed police reports in all of these cases, but in the instance of
the mother punching me, the district attorney's office indicated they did not
charge batteries "unless there's blood."2 8 It was impossible to locate the
person guilty of stealing my wallet,209 and the police reported that they did
not find the person who tried to break in.210 I had a sheriff s deputy help me
206In April 1999, I appeared on a panel with two other victims at a training session for
judges and prosecutors in Indiana. One was a victim of horrendous abuse by her husband, and
the other was a victim of kidnaping and rape. When I asked what, if anything, in their
experience with the legal process helped, both mentioned caring responses from law
enforcement. The kidnap-rape victim emphasized that the prosecutor kept her notified and
stayed in touch throughout the process. She also emphasized the helpfulness of the prosecutor's
victim-witness coordinator. The offender in her case was convicted and given a very long
sentence.
210 My client-a mentally ill person who was challenging both his commitment and
having his mother as guardian-had been saying for years that his mother was violent. His
psychiatrists had dismissed his claims because, after all, he was mentally ill, even though he
always "decompensated" when he was sent home from the hospital. At least the attack gave the
psychiatrists reason to believe my client's assertions.
2011 found the assault quite frightening, but the district attorney indicated that as there was
no blood or bruising, the office didn't usually prosecute such simple assaults. I probably could
have insisted on filing charges, but my goal-protecting my client from his mother-had been
accomplished, and I didn't see much value in prosecuting her either.
2'A number of my clients, who were prostitutes in the area in which the theft occurred,
were angry that this had happened and spent considerable time looking in dumpsters and trash
cans for the wallet, which, ironically, had the business cards of some of the area's most
outstanding criminal defense lawyers in it.
21"'They stopped one possible suspect but said he looked "too straight." I couldn't have
identified him anyway, as I did not get a close look at him before calling the police. I have
often wondered, given the "straight" appearance of the man who raped me a week later,
whether it was the same person.
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secure the windows and doors of my home after that scare. Then, on
November 15, 1981, 1 was beaten, raped, and robbed by a burglar.,I
A stranger broke into my home sometime around 3:00 a.m. I awoke to
find him on top of me; when I asked, "What areyou doing here?" he replied,
"I'm going to fuck you." "The hell you are," was my response, as I awakened
and struggled against him. During the brief struggle, he snarled, "You bitch."
He broke my nose, dislocated my jaw, and used a screwdriver to poke at my
face. The rapist started demanding, "Spread your legs, spread your legs!" I
had bruises and cuts on my legs as a result of trying to resist. I then worried
he might use the screwdriver to rape or kill me. My cat started crying, and he
threatened to kill her. I suddenly thought that if I did not cooperate, he'd kill
me, and I wouldn't survive to "get him." Somewhere in the course of the
events, he put a pillow over my face, but I did have an opportunity to see him
before that happened, because after the attempted break in, I had kept a lamp
on in my bedroom.
After he raped me, he threatened to kill me if I moved. He demanded my
jewelry---"Where's your jewelry? Where's your diamonds? Where's your
jewelry?"-over and over again. I said something rude in response. I moved
once to be able to breathe, and he was right back, jabbing with the screw-
driver: "I'll kill you! I'll kill you!" When I finally felt he was gone, I took a
chance, got up, locked my bedroom door and dialed 911. I said I wanted to
report a rape and gave my address. The dispatcher replied "Are you sure it
was a rape?" I remember saying "Look, it was a righteous 261 212 there was
penetration." To this day, I do not remember the rest of that conversation.
The prosecutor and the defense lawyer later indicated that I gave a descrip-
tion of the rapist during the call. (I have never heard the tape, but later it
became clear that my descriptiolis had been consistent throughout.) I am
aware I stayed on the phone until there was a knock on the bedroom door and
the dispatcher told me it was the police. The police"1 3 arrived only a few
minutes after the call, if that.
I became properly hysterical when the police arrived, hugging one of the
officers, and then went into a controlled mode in order to help apprehend the
rapist. I was also frantic when I realized my cat had gotten out. She was an
indoor cat who had been declawed and knew nothing of cars or unfriendly
21,Some of this narrative first appeared in Lynne Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?,
3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 221-24 (1987-88) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE
(1987)).
2r"The California Penal Code section for forcible, nonmarital rape. Technically, it was
section 261(2) at the time.
2'"in my speaking and writing, I have referred to the law enforcement officers as '"the
police," a general term for such officers. The officers who responded, investigated, and assisted
in the case were, to be perfectly accurate, sheriff's deputies and detectives.
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dogs, and I am eternally grateful to the officer who went out, searched for
her, and found her. (As upset as I was about my cat, it would hardly have
been relevant to any issues at trial, any more than the fact that my mother had
given me the nightgown that I was wearing that was torn in the assault. But
these are little things that hurt and haunt.)
After the police interviewed me, they let me make some telephone calls
and asked if I wanted them to contact someone from rape crisis. (I did.) Very
quickly, it seemed, they got a call, and we went to a show-up for an in-field
identification. I immediately told the police that he was the wrong man. When
we returned to my home, I noticed that my car was missing from the
carport." 4 Then we were off again, lights and siren, for another show-up. This
time I identified the person-I had to be restrained from getting out of the car
and going after him. And although I knew the research about inaccurate
eyewitness identification, I definitely knew he was the rapist.
We drove to a substation. I could have felt victimized by the delay in
getting me to the hospital, but the police were trying to do their job. The only
uncomfortable thing was that I was left outside, sitting alone in the patrol car;
it was still dark, and I was scared, so I wandered into the station. They
apologized.215 It seemed like forever before I was taken to the hospital. I
could have felt victimized by both lapses, but I understood that in order to
catch the man who had done this, I had to help.
At the hospital, I was fortunate enough to encounter a very sensitive and
caring doctor in the emergency room. It was a long wait-Saturday nights
and early Sunday mornings tend to be extremely busy times in emergency
rooms-but the rape crisis advocate was there, and a friend had driven thirty
miles to be there with me. One of the officers remained at the hospital with
me as well, patiently discussing my concerns about the developing case, and
providing support. I was at the hospital for a seeming eternity-roughly only
five hours-concerned about my cat, exhausted, numb, in pain, and
intermittently hysterical.
The police held a line-up at which I failed to identify the rapist. The
accused had changed his appearance; there were thirteen other women there
who had been assaulted; I was in physical pain because of my nose; and it
was an excellent line-up. I could not really be sure which man it was,
although I did mention the defendant as a possible match. The police worked
long hours on the case, and the forensic evidence was very strong. Indeed, it
214My distressed exclamation, "'He took Bubbles!" led to some confusion and
embarrassment: I had to explain that "*Bubbles" was my car. I perhaps made up for this by
knowing my license plate number.215They also told me the suspect was -not talking." I replied, "Good, if he wants a lawyer,
get-or give-him a lawyer. I want the statement to be clean."
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was what district attorneys called a "cold case"--a sure winner. Nevertheless,
I had to testify at both the preliminary hearing and at a jury trial, presumably
because the district attorney made no offers to the defendant. (He told me the
offer was "as charged.") I also testified at a pretrial hearing to suppress any
in-court identification of the defendant.1 6
The man was arrested within an hour of my 911 call; his bail was set at
an amount he never could have paid; the preliminary hearing was roughly ten
days later. The trial was held within three months of the crime. The deputy
district attorney met with me briefly, and both the investigating detective and
the same deputy district attorney stayed in touch, asking me if I wished to
continue at each stage of the proceedings. Even though the district attorney
clearly wanted to prosecute and the police were celebrating the evidence and
arrest, I felt that they would respect my wishes about going forward. I did not
receive "special" treatment-no one helped me walk through my testimony
or asked me much after the initial interviews-but I was treated courteously.
The officers were friendly and supportive. I was on standby for motions and
trial and was called to court when needed. When I fretted about the initial
detention of the defendant, police assured me that he had been found standing
near my car holding my television, which was quite enough to establish
reasonable suspicion under then-existing California law. I cannot remember
the circumstances under which he eventually made a statement, and I am not
sure I ever knew them. Yet, I do remember being told that he was given the
Miranda warnings.
It could be argued that, because I was a criminal defense attorney who
had tried a number of cases, I did not need anyone to explain anything to me
or walk me through my testimony, although I certainly would have appreci-
ated it. I may have communicated and connected well with the police and
prosecutor in that I spoke their language easily-the kind of shorthand that
develops to hasten meaning, such as the use of penal code sections for crimes,
etc. "Two-sixty-one" is so much easier to say than rape. Yet, I felt almost
paralyzed with fear before I took the stand to testify in front of ajury, having
2 "The defense argued that the show-up was impermissibly tainted because the suspect
was handcuffed when I saw him. I honestly perceived no handcuffs. At the time, I was
concentrating on his hair, face, clothes and upper body, the things I had seen best during the
attack. The judge denied the motion, but he instructed me not to give my "expert" opinion on
the circumstances and quality of the line-up. At trial, on cross examination, the defense
"opened the door' to my giving such testimony: I remember staring at the district attorney
when counsel asked the question, fearing that if I answered without a ruling, the case would
mistry. The district attorney probably only took a few moments before he said "May we
approach?" although it felt like hours. I was allowed to testify about the conditions of the line-
up and later, when the defense lawyer showed me a photograph of the line-up, I identified the
defendant-and then whispered, "It was a good line-up."
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tortured myself with every possible question that I could think of that the
defense could ask. It was also true that at that time, many district attorneys
did not do much to prepare their victim-witnesses for testifying and cross-
examination, perhaps because of time constraints.3 7 I was, grateful that
California had a rape shield law and that the defense didn't even try to ask
about my sexual history.
"My" case was joined with another case which was similar but did not
involve a rape. The other victim testified before me. After I testified at trial,
I was discouraged, but not barred, from attending the remainder of the trial.
I believe that staying away was better for me than attending the trial, because
it would have been painful for me,2 8 and there was really nothing to be
gained by my presence. The rapist was convicted on all counts in both cases,
and the jury came back hunting for more charges. -23 9 He was sentenced within
a month of the verdict to a very long prison term, with even more time
suspended.
I did attend the sentencing hearing, but I did not speak or offer a
statement. The sentencing judge had heard my testimony; I felt the damage
to me was done; my revenge fantasies had faded. It was in some ways sad to
see a nineteen-year-old's life ruined-California prisons, at least the ones I
have visited, are not nice places by any stretch of the imagination-although
he did seem to be very dangerous and incapacitating him would protect
others. I very much doubted-and still doubt-that he had any opportunity
for rehabilitation. In other words, my reactions were mixed, and I felt little
satisfaction or as if I could "now put it all behind me."
My experience with the criminal justice system in this case was in many
ways perfectly in line with the model of victim's rights advocated by
supporters of a federal constitutional amendment. I had notice every step of
the way and was treated with respect. There was little, if any, delay between
the crime, preliminary hearing, trial, conviction, and sentencing. The rapist
received a long prison term. Even the appeal was written and decided quickly.
I had two opportunities to testify about the substance of the offense. I had
support from the rape crisis people, the police, and the prosecutor. The judge
was unbiased, neutral, and formally courteous to me, as he should have been.
27I do know that Detective Bryan Cassandro indicated that he had provided another
victim of the same man with a great deal of support and transportation to and from court; her
case was severed for trial, and, as it was an acquaintance rape, I am sorry to say that the
prosecution dropped the case after obtaining convictions in my case and the one that remained
joined.
2 'The deputy district attorney may not have wanted another lawyer breathing down his
neck, either-and I knew myself well enough to know that I might leap to my reet and shout
-objection" if the occasion arose.
2 "An error in the Superior Court information omitted the auto theft charge.
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(Of course, I wanted him to be totally on my side, whatever that means, but
I also knew that I was hardly objective.) The defense lawyer did not try to
"slime" me or ask inappropriate questions.221 I had friends in the courtroom
to whom I could look for support at the preliminary hearing, the trial, and the
sentencing, and friends who attended the trial at other times let me know
what had happened. (Some of the information I could have done without,
such as being told about the "heavy breather" in the public audience who
watched my testimony.)
Despite the success of the criminal trial, I learned very early that
recovery takes place regardless of the criminal process. I still had a life to put
back together. The process of healing started after I was raped and continued
for years. Immediately after the rape, I was exhausted, stiff, sore, and
uncomfortable. My first "healing" project was to recover physically, which
involved many trips to the doctor, having my nose set, dealing with the
horrors of crab lice, and facing the fears of pregnancy and AIDS.
22
Emotionally, I dealt with anger and terror from the beginning as well.
For months after the rape, I was easily startled and frightened-at the least
little noise, I would jump and sometimes scream. I was in pain. I was furious
with men and my vulnerability. I had nightmares. I felt guilty because I had
not resisted "enough." For a year, I did not get over a kind of perpetual state
of panic, a state probably not helped by being asked to testify in another case
against the rapist. (That case was similar in every respect except there was no
rape, "only" the burglary, assault, coverage of the victim's face with a pillow,
and robbery. I should note that my experiences with the district attor-
ney-one from a different county-were "creepy"; he seemed to have an
almost prurient interest in the details of my experience.)
222
It took about three or four years for the "anniversary" nightmares to stop.
It took even more time for me to overcome occasional flashbacks-reading
2201 admit my reaction to the defense lawyer was one most victims probably have, even
when the defense is being perfectly courteous. I became irritated with him a few times and
probably resented his asking me anything. I also thought he could have done a better job for
his client; he made the mistake that "opened the door' to my giving my professional opinion
of the line-up and another when, in frustration, he threw a photo of the line-up at me, causing
me inadvertently to jump back in my chair, startled. Of course, by that time it was easy to pick
the defendant (and from my point of view after the trial, it was a stupid mistake).
"'As I have written elsewhere, my main words to medical staff at the hospital were "Give
me DES!' (the "morning after" pill). See Lynne Henderson, Whose Nature? Practical Reason
and Patriarchy, 38 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 169, 184 (1990). No test for HIV existed at the time;
five years later I tested negative to my great relief, but the shame and grief resurfaced when I
went to be tested.
222This feeling later was confirmed by rape crisis workers who counseled victims in cases
upon which he had worked; eventually, they succeeded in having him removed from
prosecuting sexual assault cases.
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or hearing about another's experience still can bring me back to that horrible
morning. I also lost my home-I was attacked in the first home I had ever
owned, and although I tried hard to live there after the rape, I was too terrified
to remain. This is not an uncommon reaction: many victims move from the
place where they were attacked, although many do not. I was very lucky
because I could afford to move without selling the house first, even if it
resulted in some financial strain, an option many victims do not have. Even
so, the grief of losing my home remained.
I was fortunate in other ways-the State of California paid for the
emergency room and medical care arising from my injuries; the victim's
compensation fund paid for my psychotherapy after some mild bureaucratic
hassles. (At that time, victim's compensation was underfunded in California.
When I called to inquire why my claim had not yet been reimbursed, the man
with whom I spoke said, "Oh, you're the lawyer"--as if that meant I was less
deserving in some way. The local victim-witness program man with whom
I had been in touch assisted in moving the process along.) I had other
resources, and my law firm was kind enough to let me, a new associate who
was supposed to have started the day after I was raped, take time off,
including time off for the trial and a trip immediately before the trial, taken
to get away from the stress. The local newspaper carried a fair amount of
coverage of the rape, including mention of the street on which I lived and my
profession, enough information for anyone who knew me to realize who I
was. No reporters bothered me, however.
I was in ajurisdiction where the police and prosecutors had training and
knowledge about rape and its effects and were sensitive as a result. Unbeliev-
ably, in 1999, there are still many jurisdictions where this is not true. But this
is not because there are no victim's rights amendments; rather, it is because
of inadequate resources and lack of commitment to training, victim-witness
assistance programs, and rape crisis groups. I was also fortunate because I
understood and knew the law and the process, and was therefore not confused
about the meaning of proceedings or rulings. But I want to emphasize again
that I only was "in role" as an attorney a few times. Most of the time I was a
frightened, needy victim-just as so many others. I could have taken offense
at some of the remarks made to me, but I was well aware of the real concern
and assistance that the district attorney and officers gave me.22 3
My experience is only my own, but nothing I have heard or read in the
stories of other survivors leads me to believe that my experience and attempts
223When I asked the district attorney what I should wear for the prelim-something of
which perhaps women are more conscious but something that relates to the general staging of
a trial by any good lawyer-he cracked --Don't wear consent defense clothes." I was not
amused, but he was undoubtedly talking lawyer to lawyer, not lawyer to scared-needy-me.
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to recover from the trauma are "unique." 4 Certainly, having the perpetrator
found accountable and responsible provides some relief to victims, but the
primary issues of trauma remain. Even if the offender is found guilty of all
serious charges, as in my case, it does not necessarily make the victim happy.
My experience with "the system" was ideal from the perspective of the
vision of many victim's rights advocates. However, this ideal occurred
without any victim's rights amendment. In many cases where the evidence is
strong, things move along rapidly and victims have decent experiences. We
do not hear about them, perhaps because they do not feel particularly
aggrieved by the process.
Although I have great sympathy for victims whose cases do not go well,
who see their actual assailants acquitted or given light sentences-as in many
rape and battering cases-and also for those whose offenders are never
found, I know that healing is possible and independent of a guilty verdict.25
I realize that the criminal justice system does not exist to make us happy or
to make it all go away. Rather, the system serves the community's interests
in deterring and punishing crime without brutalizing victims in the process.
V. CONCLUSION
No general law or legal system can sensitively address or provide
nuanced responses to all the issues raised by extreme trauma. Rather than
adopting a constitutional amendment dealing with a very narrow category of
victims and situations-those in which someone is labeled a relevant victim
of a violent crime, someone is charged with the crime, and someone is
convicted of the crime-to deal with victims compassionately, we need to
concentrate on things that aid recovery.
Congress and the states are currently experimenting with different
formulations of victim's rights and entitlements. We do not know yet which
are effective and which are not, which are helpful and which are not. We do
not yet even have information from victims who are not part of the "victim's
rights movement," who might provide insight into the process, giving us
information about what helped and what hurt. In light of this lack of
knowledge, it is far too early to enact a constitutional amendment without
"4Almost immediately after the rape, the victim-witness person working with me asked
ifl would talk to another victim of a terrible rape to help her understand the process; I did so.
Later she told me that she had as good an experience as possible and was feeling positive about
the process. For a while, I was certified as a rape crisis counselor in California, and I did a bit
of formal work in Bloomington. I have also had many informal contacts with victims.
m2 For a superbly written account of healing from a blitz rape where the perpetrator was
never found, see NANCY VENABLE RAINE, AFTER SILENCE: RAPE AND MY JOURNEY BACK
(1998).
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knowing how it will affect the law of criminal procedure, the law of evidence,
and substantive criminal law. The issues are not simple ones of cops and
robbers, good guys and bad guys, and to enact a constitutional amendment on
that basis would be a grave error.
